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1. INTRODUCTION 
!
In July 2010 the Commission published a communication titled “Towards a 
Comprehensive European International Investment Policy” expressing its vision of a 
common investment policy with the ultimate goal of replacing the network of bilateral 
investment treaties (the “BITs”) concluded between Member States and third 
countries by a regulation based on measures (legislation as well as international 
treaties) taken primarily by the European Union (the “EU”). It shall be noted that 
regulation of foreign investments is traditionally seen as a prerogative of sovereign 
states. 
The present thesis reflects current discussions over whether EU law provides 
for a regulation of foreign investments comparable to the regulation covered by the 
current BITs concluded by Member States.  
For this purpose, the thesis concentrates on identifying the differences 
between the regulation of foreign investment provided for by EU law and the one 
secured by the mentioned BITs.  
First, in Chapter 2.2 the competence of the EU within the field of foreign 
investment is analysed. The analysis focuses primarily on the post-Lisbon regulation 
as well as its implications for future international investment agreements concluded 
by the EU as part of the common investment policy (the “future EU IIAs”). 
The core substantive part is dedicated to individual elements of foreign 
investment law and how they are covered by each regulatory system (i.e. EU law and 
BITs). Chapter 2.3 explores the scope of both EU law and BITs regulation by 
determining what is covered by the notion of investment under each system. Chapter 
2.4 discusses the promotion and admission of foreign investments. Chapter 2.5 
focuses on the standards of treatment. Chapter 2.6 concentrates on the subject of 
expropriation. Finally, Chapter 2.7 analyses the means of dispute settlement available 
to investors under the different regulatory systems. 
The chapters are further divided to reflect separately on the regulation 
provided by BITs and the regulation ensuing from EU law, referring from time to 
time to regulation contained in EU IIAs concluded by the EU prior to the entry into 
! $!
force of the Lisbon Treaty as regulation provided therein might be indicative of future 
content of EU IIAs concluded within the common investment policy. 
The individual chapters (EU Competence, Defining Investment and Investor, 
Admission and Promotion, Standards of Treatment and Protection, Expropriation and 
Dispute Settlement) are summarized by concluding notes on the subject at the end of 
respective chapters identifying the conclusions reached with regard to the differences 
in the regulation offered by EU law and BITs and their implications for the common 
investment policy and future EU IIAs. 
The analysis provided herein is by no means exhaustive. 
!  
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2. INTERACTION BETWEEN BITS AND EU LAW 
 
2.1 Current State of Affairs 
In July 2010 the Commission published the Communication “Towards a 
Comprehensive European International Investment Policy”1 presenting its vision of a 
common international investment policy, which is to transfer the regulation of foreign 
investment, traditionally considered to be the domain of sovereign states, from 
Member States to the EU. 
The ground form the common EU investment policy was paved by the Lisbon 
Treaty2, which, by its entry into force on December 1 2009, vested the EU with an 
exclusive competence to regulate foreign direct investments as part of its common 
commercial policy3 pursued towards third countries, meaning that Member States will 
no longer be competent to legislate, conclude international treaties or take any other 
measures on the subject of foreign direct investments except for when provided so in 
the EU legislation4. 
Although the competence of the EU within the field of foreign investment was 
limited prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU had already taken 
measures that headed “towards a broad and proactive approach on the issues”5. In its 
endeavours it was heavily supported by the ECJ and its jurisprudence on implied 
powers and had already inter alia concluded a number of international treaties 
affecting foreign investment (hereinafter referred to as “EU IIAs”, i.e. Investment 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Towards a comprehensive 
European international investment policy”, COM(2010)343. 
2 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, 13 December 2007, 2007/C 306/01. 
3 See also BUNGENBERG, M., The Division of Competences Between the EU and Its Member States 
in the Area of Investment Politics. In HINDELANG, S., BUGENBERG, M., GRIEBEL, J. (Eds.), 
European Yearbook of International Economic Law. Special Issue: International Investment Law and 
EU Law. London: Springer, 2011, p. 29-43:“... the Lisbon Treaty, at least in the area of the CCP, 
constitutes a benchmark and a shift of paradigms. Of all  changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty, 
the ones regarding the CCP seem to bet he largest but sill the least discussed ones.“ 
4 See Article 207 (6) TFEU. 
5 BUNGENBERG, M., The Division of Competences Between the EU and Its Member States in the 
Area of Investment Politics. In HINDELANG, S., BUGENBERG, M., GRIEBEL, J. (Eds.), European 
Yearbook of International Economic Law. Special Issue: International Investment Law and EU Law. 
London: Springer, 2011, p. 29-43. 
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International Agreements concluded by the EU) and enacted rules relating to foreign 
investment policy. 
At the same time, however, an intricate network of bilateral investment 
treaties was being developed by Member States. Thus, two competing regimes 
regulating foreign investments have existed simultaneously. 
The importance of the topic is widely acknowledged for a number of reasons. 
First, from the practical point of view the common commercial policy is still the most 
important field of the EU external policy.6 Second, the EU is an important global 
player and concludes numerous agreements (be it bilateral or international) with its 
strategic partners, which directly affect foreign investments.7 Third, the changes 
brought about by the Lisbon Treaty affect significantly the distribution of powers 
between the EU and its Member States. Fourth, there are ensuing legislation proposal 
calling fall the common investment policy.8 
Currently, discussion is being held over the scope of the EU regulation over 
foreign investments and whether it actually has the potential to replace the regulation 
provided by BITs in full. Especially the competence of the EU to cover certain crucial 
aspects of foreign investment protection, such as expropriation or investor-state 
arbitrations, raise doubts. Some suggest, addressing the limits of the newly gained 
competence, that the Lisbon Treaty and its provisions relating to foreign direct 
investment are just “half way toward a common investment policy”9. 
The present thesis will therefore further analyse the question in an attempt to 
draw conclusions on the actual (dis)similarity between the regulation provided by the 
EU and the regulation accorded by BITs. 
 
!  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 See also DIMOPOULOS, A., The Effects of the Lisbon Treaty on the Principles and Objectives of the 
Common Commercial Policy. In European foreign affairs review, 2010, No. 15, p. 153-170. 
7 See also BUNGENBERG, M., Going global? The EU Common Commercial Policy After Lisbon. 
HEMRANN, C., TERHECHTE, J.P. (Eds.), European Yearbook of International Economic Law. 
London: Springer, 2010, p. 123-153. 
8 KRAJEWSKI, M., The Reform of the Common Commercial Policy. In BIONDI, A., EECKHOUT, P., 
European Union Law after the Treaty of Lisbon. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
9 SHAN, W., ZHANG, S.: The Treaty of Lisbon: Half Way toward a Common Investment Policy. In 
The Euroepan Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, no. 4, 2011, p. 1049. 
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2.2 EU competence 
“The nature and scope of the Community’s (now Union’s) competence with 
regard to the common commercial policy has been a “constitutional construction 
site” of growing complexity since the early days of the European Economic 
Community. The Treaty of Lisbon clarifies some of the pertinent and disputed issues, 
but also raises new questions.”10 
2.2.1 Principle of Conferral 
The competence of the EU to act within the field of foreign investment rests, 
as in any other sphere, on the principle of attributed powers (the principle of 
conferral) meaning that the EU can only act if there is a relevant legal basis. A 
competence for which there is no legal basis in the Treaties remains with Member 
States. This principle is enshrined in Article 5 (2) TFEU stating that “under the 
principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences 
conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out 
therein. Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the 
Member States”. 
Article 5 TEU11 applies to both internal and external actions of the EU, i.e. the 
power to enact internal measures and legislation as well as to adopt external measures 
and conclude international agreements.12 In other words, the fact that the EU enjoys 
internal competence in a certain field does not automatically mean that the EU is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 KRAJEWSKI, M., The Reform of the Common Commercial Policy. In BIONDI, A., EECKHOUT, 
P., European Union Law after the Treaty of Lisbon. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 298. 
11 Article 5 TEU: 
“1. The limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of conferral. The use of Union 
competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
2. Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences 
conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. 
Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States. 
3.Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by 
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level. 
The institutions of the Union shall apply the principle of subsidiarity as laid down in the Protocol on 
the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. National Parliaments ensure 
compliance with the principle of subsidiarity in accordance with the procedure set out in that Protocol. 
4. Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall not exceed 
what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties. 
The institutions of the Union shall apply the principle of proportionality as laid down in the Protocol 
on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.” 
12 DIMOPOULOS, A., EU Foreign Investment Law. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 67. 
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entitled to conclude international agreements relating to that particular field of 
regulation. As analysed below, the external competence occurs either in case of a 
separate explicit legal basis or in case the conditions of the doctrine of implied powers 
are met. 
2.2.2 Categories of EU Competences 
Even in case when a power is conferred on the EU a further analysis (with 
reference to Articles 2 to 6 TFEU) shall be carried out to identify the nature of a 
particular competence. Depending on the extent of cooperation with Member States 
involve a competence falls into one of the three categories of: 
a) exclusive competences13; 
b) shared competences14; 
c) supportive, coordinative or supplementary competences15. 
For the purposes of analysis EU competence over foreign investments 
categories of exclusive and shared competences are of importance. 
2.2.3 Exclusive Competence over Direct Investments 
The post-Lisbon competence of the EU within the field of foreign investments 
is primarily based on Article 207 TFEU 16  providing for the EU’s exclusive 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 See Article 2(1) TFEU: “When the Treaties confer on the Union exclusive competence in a specific 
area, only the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts, the Member States being able to do 
so themselves only if so empowered by the Union or for the implementation of Union acts.“ For the list 
of fields where exclusive competence is practised see Article 3 (1) TFEU. For exclusive competence to 
conclude international agreement see Articel 3 (2) TFEU. 
14 See Article 2 (2) TFEU: “When the Treaties confer on the Union a competence shared with the 
Member States in a specific area, the Union and the Member States may legislate and adopt legally 
binding acts in that area. The Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent that the 
Union has not exercised its competence. The Member States shall again exercise their competence to 
the extent that the Union has decided to cease exercising its competence.” For the list of principal areas 
where shared competence ix exercised see Article 4 TFEU. 
15 See Article 2 (5) TFEU: “In certain areas and under the conditions laid down in the Treaties, the 
Union shall have competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of 
the Member States, without thereby superseding their competence in these areas.“ For the list of areas 
see Article 6 TFEU. 
16 Article 207 (relevant parts) 
“1. The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly with regard to 
changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade in goods and 
services, and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct investment, the 
achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect trade 
such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies. The common commercial policy shall be 
conducted in the context of the principles and objectives of the Union’s external action. … 
3. Where agreements with one or more third countries or international organisations need to be 
negotiated and concluded, Article 218 shall apply, subject to the special provisions of this Article.” 
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competence17 over the common commercial policy18, which now explicitly includes 
foreign direct investment.19  
As it transpires from the wording of the mentioned Article, the explicit 
exclusive competence is limited to foreign direct investment20 thus leaving other, non-
direct forms of investment such as portfolio investments, state contracts and 
concessions, loans or intellectual property rights  (which are, generally speaking, 
covered by BITs) beyond the reach of the mentioned exclusive competence.  
It means that “if the EU only had competence to conclude international 
agreements on foreign direct investment, it would not be capable of concluding 
agreements according to the commonly accepted international standard. Indeed, any 
new agreement concluded by the EU, unless concluded together with the Member 
States (mixed agreement), could and would necessarily lag behind the level of 
investment protection afforded by BITs today.”21  
This would leave the competence of the EU crippled and lagging significantly 
behind the current BITs regulation, therefore effectively ruling out the replacement of 
BITs by EU regulation. This seems to be incompatible with, at least, the vision of the 
Commission, thus more thought has been put into interpretation and potential use of 
other EU law instruments and relevant case law and the competence of the EU has 
been seemingly stretched to cover the scope of BITs regulation, as discussed below. 
* 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 See also Article 3 (1) (e) TFEU explicitly holding that the EU shall have exclusive competence over 
the common commercial policy, which, in fact, codifies the conclusions of the CJEU reached on the 
exclusive power of the EU in the matters of common commercial policy. See also CJEU Opinion 1/75 
(Local Costs). 
18 The common commercial policy covers both measure adopted by the EU institutions and agreements 
negotiated with third countries at the EU level. See also CRAIG, P., DE BURCA, G., EU Law: Texts, 
cases, and Materials, 4th ed.. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 183. On the evolutionary 
character of the common commercial policy see DIMOPOULOS, A., The Common Commercial Policy 
after Lisbon: Establishing parallelism between internal and external economic relations? In Croatian 
Yearbook of European Law & Policy, Vol. 4, 2008, p. 102-131. 
19 The common commercial policy comprises an autnomous (i.e. internal EU legislation regulating 
trade) and international (i.e. conclusion of international agreements) dimesions. 
20 Definition and interpretation of the term „foreign direct ivnestment“ is dealt with in chapter 2.3 
(„Definining Investment and Investor“). 
21 HINDELANG, S., MAYDELL, N., The EU’s Common Investment Policy – Connecting the Dots. In 
HINDELANG, S., BUGENBERG, M., GRIEBEL, J. (Eds.), European Yearbook of International 
Economic Law. Special Issue: International Investment Law and EU Law. London: Springer, 2011, p. 
12-13. 
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The fact that exclusive competence of the EU is, under Article 207 TFEU, 
limited to foreign direct investment does not automatically mean that the EU has no 
competence to regulate non-direct forms of investment whatsoever since the EU 
might well be competent on the basis of other Treaty provisions.22  
Although expert discussion on the topic has not yet been completed, the 
opinions expressed suggest that the EU competence to conclude international 
agreements is extended to cover non-direct forms of investments as well on the basis 
of the principle of implied external powers, i.e. “the EU continues to have implied 
non-exclusive, i.e. shared, competence to conclude international agreements relating 
not just to foreign direct investment, but also to portfolio investment. Therefore, the 
EU will be competent, based on its explicit exclusive competence in Art. 207 TFEU 
for foreign direct investment and its implied shared competence for portfolio 
investment, to conclude international agreements providing for the standard 
commonly seen in today’s BITs without any Member State’s involvement.”23  
This would result in the fact that “the Union is exclusively competent 
concerning those aspects of the agreement which relate to foreign direct investment, 
the Member States remain competent concerning portfolio investments. The practical 
consequence is that all investment agreements which cover both aspects need to be 
concluded as mixed agreements.”24 
The conclusion stated above appears to be a modest version of the statement 
made by the Commission in its Communication25 claiming that the EU has an implied 
exclusive external competence relating to portfolio investments based on the 
provisions on the freedom of capital movements.26 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 See also Article 4 (1) TFEU. 
23 HINDELANG, S., MAYDELL, N., The EU’s Common Investment Policy – Connecting the Dots. In 
HINDELANG, S., BUGENBERG, M., GRIEBEL, J. (Eds.), European Yearbook of International 
Economic Law. Special Issue: International Investment Law and EU Law. London: Springer, 2011, p. 
13. 
24 KRAJEWSKI, M., The Reform of the Common Commercial Policy. In BIONDI, A., EECKHOUT, 
P., European Union Law after the Treaty of Lisbon. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
25 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Towards a comprehensive 
European international investment policy”, COM(2010)343, p.8. 
26 As a critique of the mentioned statement put it, the statement “ignores the express intention of the 
drafters of the Lisbon Treaty to limit the EU’s competence to foreign direct investment”. 
KRAJEWSKI, M., The Reform of the Common Commercial Policy. In BIONDI, A., EECKHOUT, P., 
European Union Law after the Treaty of Lisbon. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.  However, it 
shall be taken into consideration that the views of Krajewski are often rejected as being to restrictive. 
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2.2.4 Implied Powers  
As outlined above, despite the principle of conferral, powers of the EU can be 
expanded by virtue of the doctrine of implied powers formerly based on the case law 
according to which the EU possesses not only the powers expressly provided for in 
the Treaties but also powers implied from explicit Treaty provisions. 
In fact, the Commission in its Communication argues that certain internal 
market provisions (such as rules on capital movements) provide for an implied 
exclusive competence of the EU in accordance with Article 3(2) TFEU (“The Union 
shall also have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international 
agreement… in so far as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their 
scope.” (the relevant part only)) based on the assumption that international 
agreements on investment affect the internal market rules as governed by provisions 
on capital movements and thus the EU enjoys exclusive external competence to 
conclude international agreements affecting capital movements. 
This might, however, be a too broad reasoning. Below the relevant case law 
and Treaty provisions on the doctrine of implied powers are briefly discussed. 
2.2.4.1 Case Law on Exclusive Implied Powers 
The ECJ has developed a rich case law on the subject of exclusive implied 
powers. Based on the case law, there are basically four situations in which an 
exclusive implied power of the EU can arise.  
First, the EU has exclusive competence in case when such power is prescribed 
in secondary legislation, i.e. for instance, in case when secondary internal legislation 
explicitly states that the EU shall conclude international agreements affecting the 
treatment of third countries’ nationals.27  
Second, the EU possesses exclusive implied powers when and to the extent 
that the EU has already created extensive legislation in a certain sphere, i.e. for 
instance, in the fields where full harmonization occurs. In case of less intensive 
legislation a test would have to be applied whether an international agreement 
concluded by a Member States does have the potential to render the internal rules less 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 CJEU Opinion 1/94 (WTO), para. 95.; CJEU Opinion 2/92 (OECD), para. 33. 
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effective – in case it does the competence of the EU would be exclusive so as to 
prevent potential undermining of the internal rules.28  
Third, the exclusive competence arises also in case when the legislation does 
not cover entire field of law (the extent of “largely covered” field would suffice), but 
there is an expectation that a further legislation would be passed aimed at further 
harmonization within the field.29  
Fourth, the EU possesses external exclusive competence if and to the extent 
that it is necessary to make effective use of the respective internal competence. The 
mentioned exclusivity is further subjected to two tests: first, the exclusive external 
competence must cover the same field as the internal one and it shall be used to 
accomplish objectives of the relevant internal provision. Second, the effective use of 
the relevant internal competence can be secured neither by the Member States acting 
in concerted action nor by autonomous national legislation.30 
2.2.4.2 Case Law Codified under the Lisbon Treaty 
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the mentioned case law on 
implied powers was attempted to be codified in Article 3(2) TFEU dealing with the 
exclusive competence of the EU to conclude international agreements. The mentioned 
Article states that: “The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the 
conclusion of an international agreement when: 
I. its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union, or  
II. is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence, or 
III. in so far as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their 
scope.”  
Article 3 (2) TFEU shall be compared with Article 216(1) TFEU on the EU 
implied competence to conclude international agreements, which does not specify the 
nature of the competence, i.e. whether it is exclusive or shared competence. Article 
261 (1) TFEU reads as follows: “The Union may conclude an agreement with one or 
more third countries or international organisations: 
I. where the Treaties so provide or  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 CJEU Opinion 2/92 (OECD). 
29 CJEU Opinion 2/91 (ILO). 
30 Opinion 1/76 (ECR), para.4; CJEU Opinion 2/92 (OECD), para. 33. 
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II. where the conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to 
achieve, within the framework of the Union’s policies, one of the 
objectives referred to in the Treaties, or 
III. is provided for in a legally binding Union act or 
IV. is likely to affect common rules or alter their scope.” 
Thus, in order to determine the nature of competence (i.e. whether the 
competence to conclude international agreements is exclusive or shared) under Article 
216 (1) TFEU for each of the individual circumstances provided for therein, the 
interpretation of Article 216 (1) TFEU shall be made by reference to Article 3 (2) 
TFEU. 
When the mentioned Articles are compared they do not overlap in the 
competence to conclude “an agreement necessary in order to achieve, within the 
framework of the Union’s policies, one of the objectives referred to in the Treaties”. 
Bearing in mind that the question is still not yet settled, it seems that the external 
competence of the EU is non-exclusive (i.e. shared) only in case of concluding “an 
agreement necessary in order to achieve, within the framework of the Union’s 
policies, one of the objectives referred to in the Treaties”. 
Depending on a particular form of investment or a particular element of 
protection intended to be included in future EU IIAs the competence of the EU shall 
be determined in accordance with the mentioned Articles.31 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31  See also C-467/98 Commission v. Denmark (Open Skies): “61 The finding in the preceding 
paragraphs cannot be called into question by the fact that the measures adopted by the Council in 
relation to the internal market in air transport contain a number of provisions concerning nationals of 
non-member countries…. Contrary to what the Commission maintains, the relatively limited character 
of those provisions precludes inferring from them that the realisation of the freedom to provide 
services in the field of air transport in favour of nationals of the Member States is inextricably linked to 
the treatment to be accorded in the Community to nationals of non-member countries, or in non-
member countries to nationals of the Member States. 62 This case, therefore, does not disclose a 
situation in which internal competence could effectively be exercised only at the same time as external 
competence. 63 In the light of the foregoing considerations, it must be found that, at the time when the 
Kingdom of Denmark concluded the amendments made in 1995 with the United States of America, the 
Community could not validly claim that there was an exclusive external competence, within the 
meaning of Opinion 1/76, to conclude an air transport agreement with the United States of America.” 
See also DIMOPOULOS, A., The Common Commercial Policy after Lisbon: Establishing parallelism 
between internal and external economic relations? In Croatian Yearbook of European Law & Policy, 
Vol. 4, 2008, p.112: “…in accordance with the doctrine of implied powers, the existence of such 
implied powers requires that regulation of the activity of third country nationals in the EU as well as of 
EU nationals in third countries is necessary for the attainment of the objectives of the internal market, 
which is not always clear. Furthermore, such competence is shared with Member States and exclusivity 
arises only if the criteria of AETR-type exclusivity are fulfilled. Similar concerns exist with regard to 
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In case such competence is a shared competence it shall follow the principles 
stated in Article 2(2) TFEU: “When the Treaties confer on the Union a competence 
shared with the Member States in a specific area, the Union and the Member States 
may legislate and adopt legally binding acts in that area. The Member States shall 
exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its 
competence. The Member States shall again exercise their competence to the extent 
that the Union has decided to cease exercising its competence.”   
It means that both the EU and Member States can take measure in a field 
covered by shared competence in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity: This 
means that it is not necessary for the EU to be joined by the Member States when 
taking external action in a field of shared competence. Nevertheless, the EU cannot 
obstruct the Member States from taking autonomous action in the international 
sphere in the respective field.”32 And further: “This leads to a split of the competence 
to negotiate and conclude investment agreements. The Union is exclusively competent 
concerning those aspects of the agreement which relate to foreign direct investment, 
the Member States remain competent concerning portfolio investments. The practical 
consequence is that all investment agreements which cover both aspects of investment 
need to be concluded as mixed agreements.”33  
* 
It shall be noted that the relevant doctrine inclines to the conclusion that the 
competence of the EU, as to different forms34 of investments beyond the explicit 
competence over direct investments, is shared competence based on the assumption 
that conclusion of agreements would be necessary “in order to achieve, within the 
framework of the Union’s policies, one of the objectives referred to in the Treaties” as 
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the post-establishment treatment of foreign investors, where again the foundations of EC competence 
are rather obscure.” 
32 DIMOPOULOS, A., EU Foreign Investment Law. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 75. 
33 KRAJEWSKI, M., The Reform of the Common Commercial Policy: coherent and democratic? In 
BIONDI, A., EECKHOUT, P., RIPLEY, S. (Eds.), EU Law after Lisbon. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012, p. 302. 
34 Please note that the discussion over shared competence concerns forms of investments other that 
explicitly covered direct forms. There is a related discussion over the scope of competence which, 
however, cocnerns the question of post-entry regulation (i.e. the standards of protection rather that 
definition of investments covered) to which the conclusions stated above do not apply; this latter issue 
of the scope of competence is dealt with futher in this chapter under the heading “Standards of 
Treatment and Protection“ as well as in the chapters 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7. 
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is stated in Article 216 (1) TFEU.35 Exclusive nature of competence over other forms 
of investments is rejected on the ground that the conditions required under Article 3 
(2) TFEU are not met with regard to other forms of investments. 
For instance as far as state contracts, concessions (the freedom to provide 
services), intellectual property rights, portfolio investments as well as other 
contractual rights (the freedom of capital movements) that might be protected under 
BITs are concerned the relevant chapters in TFEU do not provide for the competence 
of the EU to conclude international agreement within their scope of regulation. At the 
same time it is argued that concluding international agreements is not necessary for 
the EU to perform its internal competence (since it functions well even nowadays 
when BITs with third countries are still in force) as well as that the conclusion of 
agreements within such fields by Member States would not affect common rules or 
alter their internal scope since they would affect investments from third countries 
meaning that the internal rules would remain intact. 
However, it shall be also noted that advocates of restrictive interpretation of 
Article 207 (1) TFEU doubt whether even a shared competence occurs in case of 
forms of investments not provided for explicitly in the mentioned Article. The 
argument rests on the opinion that such a broad interpretation is far beyond the 
objective of the common commercial (or rather investment) policy.36 
2.2.5 Standards of Treatment, Protection 
Besides the fact that the term “foreign direct investment” does not cover all 
forms of foreign investments generally protected by BITs, further uncertainties arise 
over the scope of protection, which is to be provided under Article 207 TFEU.  
Article 207 TFEU itself does not mention any restrictions or limits concerning 
the scope of protection which shall be provided thereunder.  
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35 See DIMOPOULOS, A., EU Foreign Investment Law. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2011, 
where individual forms of investments and other related issues are analysed in an attempt to determine 
the nature of the EU competence over each aspect of foreign investments. The task is beyond the scope 
of the present thesis as it si limited to general overview of selected elements of foreign investments 
regulation. The present thesis, therefore, assumes, from time to time, that the conclusions reached on 
the combination of exclusive and shared competence are correct. 
36 As regards policy objectives, the common commercial policy is subject to both Article 206 TFEU 
(specific objectives relating to the common commercial policy) and Article 21 TEU (general objectives 
relating to external policy of the EU). For more on policy objectives see also KRAJEWSKI, M., The 
Reform of the Common Commercial Policy: coherent and democratic? In BIONDI, A., EECKHOUT, 
P., RIPLEY, S. (Eds.), EU Law after Lisbon. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 295. 
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The debate is rather a discussion over the objectives of the common 
investment policy as such. Bellow follows a brief overview of the range of protection, 
which might be covered by the common investment policy and future EU IIAs. 
2.2.5.1 Trade-related aspects only 
 It has been argued, in a very restrictive way, that the scope of the protection 
for which the competence of the EU is established under Article 207 TFEU 
encompasses merely investment liberalization.37 This would basically cover only the 
internal and external conditions of market access, pre-establishment and national 
treatment, excluding post-establishment standards of treatment, protection or 
expropriation. The argument is based on the mainly on the context and purpose of the 
provision as well as on the history of the negotiations over the TFEU.38 
The provision establishing the competence over foreign direct investment is 
part of the common commercial policy, which is generally orientated towards the 
trade (especially the entry liberalization, eliminating restrictions on market access 
etc.) and not on subsequent treatment of trade articles. 
On the other hand, the face of trade policies is changing as might be suggested 
by inclusion of trade-in-services, intellectual property rights and foreign direct 
investment. Even, within the WTO there was an attempt to negotiate multilateral 
agreement on investment. Further, in case of intellectual property right, the Treaty 
explicitly states that the competence is confined to their trade-related aspects. No such 
specification is provided for in case of FDI.39 
2.2.5.2 Market access only 
Relaying on the objectives of the common commercial policy, the 
competence, it has been argued, shall be restricted to regulation of market access and 
liberalization but not that of post-entry regulation and protection.40 
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37 See, for instance, KRAJEWSKI, M., External Trade Law and the Constitution Treaty: Towards a 
Federal and More Democratic Common Commercial Policy? Common Law Review, 2005, p. 91 et 
seq. 
38 KRAJEWSKI, M., External Trade Law and the Constitution Treaty: Towards a Federal and More 
Democratic Common Commercial Policy? Common Law Review, 2005, p. 112-114. For counter-
arguments see also SHAN, W., ZHANG, S.: The Treaty of Lisbon: Half Way toward a Common 
Investment Policy. In The Euroepan Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, no. 4, 2011, p. 1059 et seq. 
39 SHAN, W., ZHANG, S.: The Treaty of Lisbon: Half Way toward a Common Investment Policy. In 
The Euroepan Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, no. 4, 2011, p. 1060-61. 
40 See LECZYKIEWICZ, D., Common Commercial Policy: The Expanding Competence of the 
European Union in the Area of International Trade. In German Law Journal, 2005, No. 6. 
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The objectives are stated in Article 206 TFEU: “By establishing a customs 
union in accordance with Articles 28 to 32, the Union shall contribute, in the common 
interest, to the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition of 
restrictions on international trade and on foreign direct investment, and the lowering 
of customs and other barriers.”41 
On the contrary, it might be argued that absence of post-entry regulation and 
protection might put off potential investors. Further, in its Opinion 1/78 the CJEU 
stated that the common commercial policy goes beyond market liberalization and 
might cover “regulation of the world market for certain products”42. 
2.2.5.3 Limited Regulation 
Article 207 (6) TFEU contains so called  “parallelism clause”. The mentioned 
Article rules out the competence of the EU which are excluded from the power of the 
EU by EU legislation itself such as public health, cultural or social services. 
Therefore, the extent of such an absolute standard would depend on whether the EU is 
entitled to take such measures internally. 43  Ceyssens argues that since neither 
protection against expropriation nor fair and equitable standard exist in the internal 
market they shall not be covered by the competence under Article 207 TFEU. 
As far as protection against expropriation is concerned, arguments were 
proposed based on Article 345 TFEU, which, it is argued, shall be interpreted 
narrowly so as to cover only the right of Member States to decide freely over whether 
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41 For principles and objectives see also KRAJEWSKI, M., The Reform of the Common Commercial 
Policy: coherent and democratic? In BIONDI, A., EECKHOUT, P., RIPLEY, S. (Eds.), EU Law after 
Lisbon. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 294 et seq.: “The objectives of Article 206 TFEU 
refer to trade liberalization, but they do not indicate a free trade policy. Instead, the wording indicates 
that the proces of trade liberalization shall be a gradual one. In this respect the objectives of Article 
206 TFEU resemble the objectives of the world trading system. The Tretay of Lisbon did not change 
the contents of the specific policy objectives of the common commercial policy much (with the 
exception of the inclusion of investment liberalization), but it modified their addressees and legal 
nature. While the TEC referred to the Member States as actors, Article 206 TFEU uses the Union as 
grammatical subject and underlines the predominant role of the Union as an actor in external trade 
policy. More importantly, Article 206 TFEU turn the gradual trade liberalization into a binding 
objective.“. See also BUNGENBERG, M., Going global? The EU Common Commercial Policy After 
Lisbon. HEMRANN, C., TERHECHTE, J.P. (Eds.), European Yearbook of International Economic 
Law. London: Springer, 2010, p. 144.  
42CJEU Opinion 1/78 (Nature Rubber Agreement). See also SHAN, W., ZHANG, S.: The Treaty of 
Lisbon: Half Way toward a Common Investment Policy. In The Euroepan Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 22, no. 4, 2011, p. 1061-2. 
43 DIMOPOULOS, A., Creating an EU Investment Policy: Challenges for the Post-Lisbon Era of 
External Relations. In CARDWELL, P.J. (Ed.), EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-
Lisbon Era. The Hague: Springer, 2012, p. 408. 
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to nationalize or privatize certain assets and does not, therefore, retain any exclusive 
rights of Member States to determine expropriation44, or in other words, “it is 
strongly argued that Article 345 TFEU should be narrowly construed, which, together 
with the broad pronouncement of FDI competence under Article 207 TFEU indicates 
that Article 207 TFEU covers also protection of FDI against expropriation.” 45 
Expropriation measures have already been dealt with in the CJEU case law and are 
covered by Article 17 of the Charter on Fundamental Freedoms. 
2.2.5.4 Full regulation and Protection 
Arguments have been raised in favour of a more generous competence so as to 
enable the EU to conclude agreements resembling US free-trade agreements. It would 
include market access, both pre- and post-establishment standards of treatment and 
protection, protection against expropriation and even a mechanism for investor-state 
dispute-settlement. 
There are no explicit restrictions placed on the scope of protection included in 
Article 207 TFEU. Thus, it might be argued, that “for reasons of efficiency and 
practicability (effet utile) the EU should possess the competence for all possible 
aspects of (foreign direct) investment promotion and protection”46.  
Finally, despite the willingness of the EU to provide for the investor-state 
arbitration in future EU IIAs, based on the argument that the EU possesses legal 
personality and thus is entitled to conclude an agreement conferring dispute-
settlement relating to its investment disputes to a forum of its choice), it is argued that 
such measure might breach the limits set out in the ECJ’s opinions47 on the relation 
between dispute settlement and the autonomy of EU law and the corresponding 
jurisdiction of the ECJ.48 
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44  BUNGENBERG, M., Going global? The EU Common Commercial Policy After Lisbon. 
HEMRANN, C., TERHECHTE, J.P. (Eds.), European Yearbook of International Economic Law. 
London: Springer, 2010, p. 144. 
45 DIMOPOULOS, A., Creating an EU Investment Policy: Challenges for the Post-Lisbon Era of 
External Relations. In CARDWELL, P.J. (Ed.), EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-
Lisbon Era. The Hague: Springer, 2012, p. 408. See also the chapter 2.6 (“Expropriation“). 
46  BUNGENBERG, M., Going global? The EU Common Commercial Policy After Lisbon. 
HEMRANN, C., TERHECHTE, J.P. (Eds.), European Yearbook of International Economic Law. 
London: Springer, 2010, p. 144. 
47 CJEU Opinion 1/91, CJEU Opinion 1/00, CJEU Opinion 1/09. 
48 DIMOPOULOS, A., Creating an EU Investment Policy: Challenges for the Post-Lisbon Era of 
External Relations. In CARDWELL, P.J. (Ed.), EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-
Lisbon Era. The Hague: Springer, 2012, p. 409. 
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It shall be noted that the exclusive competence referred to in Article 207 
TFEU focuses on extra-EU investment, i.e. investments originating in third countries. 
There is, however, abundant EU regulation covering intra-EU investments to which 
different set of rules shall be applied. Since intra-EU investments concern situation 
within the EU, the internal market rules shall be applied to such investments. 
In spite of not directly affecting third countries’ foreign investments, attention 
shall be paid to the internal market rules affecting intra-EU foreign investments since 
in most cases EU IIAs follow the terminology and system devised by the internal 
market rules, namely the provisions on regulating the freedom of capital movements, 
freedom of establishment and freedom of services. Furthermore, the mentioned rules 
represent, to a great extent, the regulation of intra-EU investments49. 
2.2.6 Competence under Internal Market Rules 
2.2.6.1 Freedom of Capital Movements 
The admission of foreign investments is regulated by the freedom of capital 
movements and the freedom of establishment. The competence of the EU to regulate 
capital movements50 is determined under Article 63 TFEU, which states that: “Within 
the framework of the provisions set out in this Chapter, all restrictions on the 
movement of capital between Member States and between Member States and third 
countries shall be prohibited.” And refers to any transfer of capital from one Member 
State to another.   
The freedom of capital movements as stated above is limited by Article 65 (1) 
and (2) TFEU: “(1) The provisions of Article 63 shall be without prejudice to the right 
of Member States: (a) to apply the relevant provisions of their tax law which 
distinguish between taxpayers who are not in the same situation with regard to their 
place of residence or with regard to the place where their capital is invested; (b) to 
take all requisite measures to prevent infringements of national law and regulations, 
in particular in the field of taxation and the prudential supervision of financial 
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49 Provisions on the freedom of capital movements (Article 64 TFEU et seq.) in fact cover the initial 
entry stage of an investment, and provisions on the freedom of establishment  (Article 49 TFEU et 
seq.) and freedom of services (Article 56 TFEU et seq.) the post-establishment stage. See also 
BELOHLÁVEK, A.J., Ochrana p!ím"ch zahrani#ních investic v Evropské unii. Praha: C.H. Beck, 
2010, p. 38, supra. 48. 
50 For the scope of the provisions on capital movements see the Annex to the Capital Directive 
88/361/EEC for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty (expired now), which comprised 
nomenclature and categorization of capital movements. 
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institutions, or to lay down procedures for the declaration of capital movements for 
purposes of administrative or statistical information, or to take measures which are 
justified on grounds of public policy or public security. (2) The provisions of this 
Chapter shall be without prejudice to the applicability of restrictions on the right of 
establishment which are compatible with the Treaties.” 
It is especially Article 63(1) TFEU on capital movements which rises 
uncertainties: “Within the framework of the provisions set out in this Chapter, all 
restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States and between Member 
States and third countries shall be prohibited.” The question stands: “If Art. 63(1) 
TFEU (ex-Art. 56 (1) EC) is read as a mere programmatic statement which 
endeavours to achieve the objective of free movement of capital between the Member 
States and third countries, the opening up of the EU market to third countries must 
then be essentially achieved by means of secondary (autonomous) legislation and the 
conclusion of international treaties, which emblematize the notion of reciprocity. If, 
however, the scope of Art. 63(1) TFEU (ex-Art. 56 (1) EC) goes beyond a mere 
programmatic statement and the freedom transfers subjective rights to a third-country 
investor similar to those of an intra-EU investor, then the EU would have committed 
itself not to interfere with – neither to discriminate nor to hinder – the access and 
operation of investments originating from third countries… In this case the EU 
market would have “automatically” been liberalized unilaterally towards third 
countries and a CIP (i.e. the common investment policy) would basically be limited to 
secure market access and favourable treatment standards for EU investments in third 
countries.”51 The conclusions of the legal literature on the subject remain divided.  
Nevertheless, measures adopted by the EU in pursuit of the policy on capital 
movements shall be without prejudice to restrictions imposed by Member States 
within the limits of Article 6452 and Article 6553 TFEU (provided such measures are 
not arbitrary). 
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51 HINDELANG, S., MAYDELL, N., The EU’s Common Investment Policy – Connecting the Dots. In 
HINDELANG, S., BUGENBERG, M., GRIEBEL, J. (Eds.), European Yearbook of International 
Economic Law. Special Issue: International Investment Law and EU Law. London: Springer, 2011, p. 
2-3. 
52 Article 64 (1) TFEU: “(1) The provisions of Article 63 shall be without prejudice to the application 
to third countries of any restrictions which exist on 31 December 1993 under national or Union law 
adopted in respect of the movement of capital to or from third countries involving direct investment — 
including in real estate — establishment, the provision of financial services or the admission of 
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2.2.6.2 Freedom of Establishment 
The provisions on freedom of establishment found in Title IV Chapter 2 
TFEU provide legal basis for the competence of the EU to regulate both primary and 
secondary establishment, i.e. setting up and managing new undertaking within the 
territory of another Member State as well as the setting up of dependant undertakings 
such as agencies, branches or subsidiaries. The ECJ case law has further refined the 
notion of the right of establishment to include also the acquisition of existing 
undertakings as well as cross-border mergers.54 
The competence to regulate the freedom of establishment is described under 
Article 49 TFEU: “Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions 
on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of 
another Member State shall be prohibited. Such prohibition shall also apply to 
restrictions on the setting-up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any 
Member State established in the territory of any Member State. Freedom of 
establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed 
persons and to set up and manage undertakings, in particular companies or firms 
within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 54, under the conditions laid 
down for its own nationals by the law of the country where such establishment is 
effected, subject to the provisions of the Chapter relating to capital.” Generally 
speaking the freedom of establishment covers foreign investments between Member 
States in the form of taking part in an undertaking and is aimed at restricting any 
prohibitions to the freedom of establishment between Member States. The 
competence of the EU is limited by Article 52 TFEU: “The provisions of this Chapter 
and measures taken in pursuance thereof shall not prejudice the applicability of 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action providing for special 
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securities to capital markets. In respect of restrictions existing under national law in Bulgaria, Estonia 
and Hungary, the relevant date shall be 31 December 1999.“ 
53 Article 65 TFEU (relevant parts): “The provisions of Article 63 shall be without prejudice to the 
right of Member States: (a) to apply the relevant provisions of their tax law which distinguish between 
taxpayers who are not in the same situation with regard to their place of residence or with regard to 
the place where their capital is invested; (b) to take all requisite measures to prevent infringements of 
national law and regulations, in particular in the field of taxation and the prudential supervision of 
financial institutions, or to lay down procedures for the declaration of capital movements for purposes 
of administrative or statistical information, or to take measures which are justified on grounds of 
public policy or public security.” 
54 See C-208/00 (Uberseering), para.77; C-411/03 (Sevic systems), para. 19. 
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treatment for foreign nationals on grounds of public policy, public security or public 
health.” 
The scope of the provisions on establishment is, however, different from that 
of capital movements inter alia in that it does not extend to include nationals of third 
countries. The competence to regulate right to establishment is restricted to the EU 
nationals as defined in Article 20 TFEU and Article 54 TFEU. 
Nevertheless, national laws of Member States shall not be prejudiced by 
measures taken by the EU in the pursuit of the freedom of establishment provided 
such laws, regulation or administrative action is taken on grounds of public policy, 
public security or public health (Article 52 TFEU). 
The scope of the EU competence (especially with regard to Article 207 TFEU) 
is blurred by the delineation between the two freedoms, i.e. the freedom of capital 
movements and the freedom of establishment, since the first (arguably) applies to 
nationals of third countries whereas the latter does not. Even in this question the ECJ 
jurisprudence provides no firm guidelines. The relevant judgments either do not 
review the question of delineation because the question was not dealt with primarily 
in relevant cases or because the parties have not referred to the freedoms or they 
assume that both freedoms are applied in parallel.55 “In more recent decisions, 
however, the ECJ shifted towards a “centre of gravity” priority to the freedom of 
establishment over the free movement of capital.”56 The criteria of “centre of gravity” 
principle giving prevalence, under certain conditions, to the freedom of establishment 
are, however, not clearly defined. The arguments pursued arguments of the ECJ 
included the demarcation of the freedoms on the basis on national legislation, i.e. in 
case the relevant national measure applied only to persons exercising definite 
influence over an undertaking the freedom of establishment applies. On the other 
hand, if no ownership interest ration is employed by national legislation both 
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55 HINDELANG, S., MAYDELL, N., The EU’s Common Investment Policy – Connecting the Dots. In 
HINDELANG, S., BUGENBERG, M., GRIEBEL, J. (Eds.), European Yearbook of International 
Economic Law. Special Issue: International Investment Law and EU Law. London: Springer, 2011, p. 
3-4. 
56 HINDELANG, S., MAYDELL, N., The EU’s Common Investment Policy – Connecting the Dots. In 
HINDELANG, S., BUGENBERG, M., GRIEBEL, J. (Eds.), European Yearbook of International 
Economic Law. Special Issue: International Investment Law and EU Law. London: Springer, 2011, p. 
4. 
! +#!
freedoms apply.57 However, in a number of cases the ECJ did not consider the 
application of the freedoms on the basis of national legislation but rather on the extent 
of influence that an investor exercises over the undertaking.58 
As Hindelang and Maydell conclude: “Although this is without any 
significance in terms of protection granted to a market participant in an intra-EU 
context, in a third-country context, the scope of  protection potentially offered by the 
TFEU is nullified.”59 
2.2.6.3 Freedom of to Provide Services 
The relation between the freedom to provide services and foreign investments 
is given with regard to state contracts and concessions, which are generally covered 
by BITs. 
The legal basis establishing the competence of the EU is provided for in 
Chapter 3 TFEU. Article 57 TFEU defines the term “services” in the following 
manner: “Services shall be considered to be ‘services’ within the meaning of the 
Treaties where they are normally provided for remuneration, in so far as they are not 
governed by the provisions relating to freedom of movement for goods, capital and 
persons.”  followed by an illustrative list of activities included within the meaning. In 
accordance with Article 58 the freedom to provide services in transport sector and in 
banking and insurance services is exempt from the Chapter 3 (the exempt services 
are, however, still covered by shared competence in accordance with Article 4 (2) 
TFEU). 
The broad definition of “services” might well encompass investor-state 
contracts, which are covered by BITs. 
In accordance with Article 62 TFEU Articles 51 to 54 TFEU shall applied to 
provision of services, meaning that the measure taken within the field of freedom of 
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57 Case C-446/04, para. 36 et seq.; Case C-524/04, para. 27 et seq.; Case C-492/04, para. 19 et seq.; 
Case C-157/05, para. 23; Case C-182/08, para 40, 47 et seq. (as cited in HINDELANG, S., 
MAYDELL, N., The EU’s Common Investment Policy – Connecting the Dots. In HINDELANG, S., 
BUGENBERG, M., GRIEBEL, J. (Eds.), European Yearbook of International Economic Law. Special 
Issue: International Investment Law and EU Law. London: Springer, 2011, p. 4.) 
58 Case C-284/06, para. 68-73; Case C-311/08, para. 23-36; Case C-531/06, para. 40-42; Joined Cases 
C-439/07 and C-499/07, paras. 68-73. 
59 HINDELANG, S., MAYDELL, N., The EU’s Common Investment Policy – Connecting the Dots. In 
HINDELANG, S., BUGENBERG, M., GRIEBEL, J. (Eds.), European Yearbook of International 
Economic Law. Special Issue: International Investment Law and EU Law. London: Springer, 2011, p. 
4. 
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provision of services shall not prejudice the applicability of national law, regulation or 
administrative actions on grounds of public policy, public security or public health 
(Article 52 TFEU).  
2.2.7   Concluding Notes 
First, exclusive competence of the EU over foreign direct investments is 
established under Article 207 (1) TFEU. 
Second, it is not clear whether a competence of the EU to regulate other forms 
of investments is given. In case such competence exists it is to be a shared 
competence. 
Third, it is not clear what scope of, if any, of post-establishment regulation 
and protection is given under Article 207 (1) TFEU. 
Fourth, the scope of protection of foreign (direct) investments is not yet 
settled. However, depending on arguments pursued the actually scope of protection 
ranges from mere market access and liberalization through regulation except for 
absolute standards and expropriation to comprehensive regulation covering all aspects 
of foreign investment regulation regularly covered by BITs. 
!  
! +%!
2.3 Defining Investment and Investor 
2.3.1 BITs 
Whether a transfer of funds constitutes an investment to which protection is 
granted under the relevant BIT is primarily determined on the basis of definition of 
foreign investment provided for in the relevant BIT. 
A similar definition of investment appears in most of BITs. In most cases60 
there is a general definition of investment supported by a list of forms, which a 
particular foreign investment might eventually take.  
General definition which occurs in most BITs provides that: the term 
"investment" shall comprise every/any kind of asset invested in connection with 
economic activities by an investor of one Contracting Party in the territory of the 
other Contracting Party. (emphasis added) 
In most cases BITs provide for an illustrative list of forms of FDI which might 
include: 
a) movable and immovable property as well as any other property rights, 
such as mortgages, pledges or any other kind of liens, ie. property 
rights to tangible assets as well as other rights to property, which are 
not full property rights;   
b) shares, stocks and bonds of companies or any other form of 
participation or interest in a company – i.e. various forms of interest in 
an enterprise61 , loans62, debt swaps63;  
c) claims to money or any other claim under contract having an economic 
value associated with an investment – i.e. certain contractual rights64;  
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60 For examples of investment definitions found in other treaties see also POLLAN, T., Legal 
Framework for the Admission of FDI. The Hague: Eleven International Publishing, 2006, p. 40-42. 
61 POLLAN, T., Legal Framework for the Admission of FDI. The Hague: Eleven International 
Publishing, 2006, p. 32. 
62 See also Fedax N.V. and The Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, Decision of the 
Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 11 July 1997; $SOB v Slovakia, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, 
Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, 24 May 1999. 
63 See also POLLAN, T., Legal Framework for the Admission of FDI. The Hague: Eleven International 
Publishing, 2006, p. 32. 
64 For the freedom of parties to define a contractual right as an investment as well as for the conditions 
to be fulfilled for a contractual right in order to be regarded as an investment see POLLAN, T., Legal 
Framework for the Admission of FDI. The Hague: Eleven International Publishing, 2006, p. 34-35. 
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d) copyrights, trade marks, patents or other intellectual property rights, 
know-how, trade secrets, goodwill and technical processes associated 
with an investment – i.e. the intellectual property rights;  
e) any right conferred by laws or under contract and any licenses and 
permits pursuant to laws, including the concessions to search for, 
extract, cultivate or exploit natural resources – i.e. licences and 
concessions obtained by an investor from the host state. 
Since the mentioned list is not exhaustive and since the general definition 
covers literally any kind of asset, further criteria have been developed in the relevant 
case law (especially the jurisprudence of the ICSID) to further refine the notion of 
foreign investment. There is, however, an on-going expert discussion as to whether 
such criteria should be considered to amount to a definition of foreign investment (in 
which case the failure to satisfy any of the criteria would result in the denial of 
existence of foreign investment) or whether such criteria should be considered to be 
merely guidelines helping to identifying a potential foreign investment.65 
One of the most frequently used set of criteria was first identified by the 
tribunal in the case Salini v. Morocco66 and comprised the following criteria:  
1) a contribution of money or other assets of economic value – shall be 
interpreted broadly to encompass both tangible and intangible assets; 
usually will comprise a complex set of different economic values 
(monetary, in kind, work force); 67  as far as pre-investment and 
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65 Gaillard, J.,  Identify or Define? Reflections on the Evolution of the Concept of Investment In ICSID 
Practice. In BINDER, C. (Ed.), International investment law for the 21st century : essays in honour of 
Christoph Schreuer. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 407-411 (“The first method is one of 
defining, which entails determining in the abstract the factors that are of the essence to an investment 
in order to then proceed in each case to a process of characterization. This process follows the classic 
methodology associating one or several constitutive elements with a legal consequence and can be 
described as deductive. The second method is intuitive. Avoiding all generalizations, it merely 
identifies features or “characteristics” that have already been observed in scholarly writings or in 
prior arbitral decisions that have accepted the existence of an investment.”) 
66 Salini Construttori S.P.A. and Italstrade S.P.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 16 July 2001, para. 52. On how the criteria were applied see also paras. 53-
57. 
67 In Salini v. Morocco with regard to contribution made the tribunal held that: „The contributions 
made by the Italian companies are set out and assessed in their written submissions. It is not disputed 
that they used their know-how, that they provided the necessary equipment and qualified personnel for 
the accomplishment of the works, that they set up the production tool on the building site, that they 
obtained loans enabling them to finance the purchases necessary to carry out the works and to pay the 
salaries of the workforce, and finally that they agreed to the issuing of bank guarantees, in the form of 
a provisional guarantee fixed at 1.5% of the total sum of the tender, then, at the end of the tender 
! +'!
development expenditures are concerned the case law is not uniform as 
to whether such expenditures shall be given protection68; contribution 
shall be made within a commercial activity69; claims ensuing from 
investments are protected as well (provided that the underlying dispute 
arose out of an investment)70; 
2) a certain duration – under most BITs short-term transfers of funds 
with no intention of establishing a long-term link with the host state 
(“volatile capital”71) are not granted protection (it might be argued 
that such investments are not worth the protection since due to their 
short-time nature they do not contribute to development of the host 
state); a duration of 2-5 years is generally accepted by the doctrine; the 
expected duration is usually determined by the relevant investment 
contract; a prolongation or extended warranty shall count as duration72; 
an expectation of certain duration is sufficient (i.e. the condition of 
duration might be satisfied even if an investment project fails right at 
the beginning)73; 
3) an element of risk – the risk taken shall be higher than in ordinary 
commercial contracts;74 risk is usually implied by long-term nature of 
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process, in the form of a definite guarantee fixed at 3% of the value of the contract in dispute. The 
Italian companies, therefore, made contributions in money, in kind, and in industry.“ 
68 Mihaly International Corporation v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/00/2, Award, 15 March 2002, para. 59. Compare with Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/06/18, Award, 28 March, 2011; Inmaris Perestroika Sailing Maritime Services GmbH 
and others v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 March 2010, para. 99-
101 
69 Franz Sedelmayer v. Russia Federation, Arbitration Award, 7 July 1998, para. 242, 436 
70 Chevron Corporation (U.S.A.) and Texaco Petroleum Corporation (U.S.A.) v. Republic of Ecuador, 
UNCITRAL, Interim Award, 1 December 2008 (NAFTA Case). Compare with Romak S.A. v. Republic 
of Uzbekistan, Award, 26 November 2009 
71 Fedax N.V. and The Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, Decision of the Tribunal on 
Objections to Jurisdiction, 11 July 1997, para. 43 
72 Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 November 2005, para 133; Consortium Groupement L.E.S.I. - 
DIPENTA v. People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/8, Award, 10 January 
2005 (French), para. 14. 
73  SCHREUER, C.H., et al., The ICSID Convention: A Commentary. Cmabridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011, p.140, para. 122. 
74 Salini Construttori S.P.A. and Italstrade S.P.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 16 July 2001, para. 52. On how the criteria were applied see also paras. 55, 
56: “The Claimants, in their reply memorial on jurisdiction, gave an exhaustive list of the risks taken 
in the performance of the said contract. Notably, among others, the risk associated with the 
prerogatives of the Owner permitting him to prematurely put an end to the contract, to impose 
variations within certain limits without changing the manner of fixing prices; the risk consisting of the 
potential increase in the cost of labour in case of modification of Moroccan law; any accident or 
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obligations undertaken; a threat of contract termination is not by itself 
risk high enough to constitute investment75; a payment in advance or a 
guaranteed minimum price for service/goods delivered etc. does not 
automatically mean that there is no risk present76; 
4) a contribution to the host State’s development – covered, for instance, 
by investor providing public services or acting in public interest or 
upon concession77; shall be interpreted broadly (even an extension of 
credit might be considered a contribution to the host state)78; 
The test was further (though the criteria are not undisputed) expanded to 
include the criteria of: 
5) certain regularity of profit and return;79 
6) assets being invested in accordance with the laws of the host State – 
protection is not granted to investments established in breach with 
national legislation of host states (including acting fraudulently)80; 
minor mistakes in registration process are not relevant81 82 
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damage caused to property during the performance of the works; those risks relating to problems of 
co-ordination possibly arising from the simultaneous performance of other projects; any unforeseeable 
incident that could not be considered as force majeure and which, therefore, would not give rise to a 
right to compensation; and finally those risks related to the absence of any compensation in case of 
increase or decrease in volume of the work load not exceeding 20% of the total contract price. / It does 
not matter in this respect that these risks were freely taken. It also does not matter that the 
remuneration of the Contractor was not linked to the exploitation of the completed work. A 
construction that stretches out over many years, for which the total cost cannot be established with 
certainty in advance, creates an obvious risk for the Contractor.“ 
75  Toto Construzioni Generali S.p.A. v. the Republic of Lebanon, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 11 September 2009, para. 79; Saipem S.p.A. v. People's Republic of 
Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Decision on Jurisdiction and Recommendation on 
Provisional Measures, 21 March 2007, para. 109. 
76 Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, 15 April 2009. 
77 Salini Construttori S.P.A. and Italstrade S.P.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 16 July 2001, para. 53 et seq. 
78 $SOB v Slovakia, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, 24 May 1999; 
Fedax N.V. and The Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, Decision of the Tribunal on 
Objections to Jurisdiction, 11 July 1997, para. 57. 
79 Fedax N.V. and The Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, Decision of the Tribunal on 
Objections to Jurisdiction, 11 July 1997, para. 43. This criterion is applied when distinguishing 
between ordinary commercial contracts (which are not protected by BITs) in which case there is 
usually a single payment for goods provided or services supplied as opposed to investments in which 
case there is an expectation of a regular payments to be received over a longer period of time. 
80 Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award, 2 August 
2006. 
81 Tokios Tokel%s v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 April 2004, 
para. 83-86. 
82 Saba Fakes v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, Award, 14 July 2010, para. 114; 
Franz Sedelmayer v. Russia Federation, Arbitration Award, 7 July 1998, para. 244-253, 275-6, 338, 
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7) assets being invested bona fide – based on an assumption that it cannot 
be reasonably expected that host states will provide protection to 
investments not made in bona fide; the criterion was first employed in 
Phoenix Action v. Czech Republic (2009)83; 
  Although not explicitly mentioned in most BITs the term “direct investment” 
shall be discussed, as the meaning of foreign direct investment is crucial for 
determination of the exclusive competence of the EU.  
In general, “direct investment” is considered to involve a participation in an 
undertaking. In most cases, however, BITs do not specifically mention the term 
“direct investment”. The participation in an undertaking is usually covered as 
protection of holding of shares or other forms of interest in an undertaking. However, 
holding of shares in an undertaking can be classifies as both direct and portfolio 
investment. The differentiating quality necessary to constitute an investment under 
BITs is a presence of lasting link between investors and an undertaking located in the 
host state and a certain level of managerial control over such undertaking. 84 
Benchmark OECD definition of “direct investment”, which is used as 
guidelines for statistical purposes, states that: “Foreign direct investment reflects the 
objective of establishing a lasting interest by a resident enterprise in one economy 
(direct investor) in an enterprise (direct investment enterprise ) that is resident in an 
economy other than that of the direct investor. The lasting interest implies the 
existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the direct 
investment enterprise and a significant degree of influence on the management of the 
enterprise. The direct or indirect ownership of 10% or more of the voting power of an 
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411; SwemBalt AB, Sweden v. Republic of Latvia, UNCITRAL, Decision by the Court of Arbitration, 
23 October 2000, para. 35; Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/26, Award, 2 August 2006, para. 238, 246-52; Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services 
Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Award, 16 August 2007, para. 
334, 339-345; Ioannis Kardassopoulos v. Georgia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/18, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 6 July 2007, para. 182; Alasdair Ross Anderson et al v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/07/3, Award, 19 May 2010, para. 52-3, 57-58; Rumeli Telekom A.S. and Telsim 
Mobil Telekomunikasyon Hizmetleri A.S. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, 
Award, 29 July 2008, para. 319. 
83 Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, 15 April 2009, para. 
114., 135 et seq.. Compare with Saba Fakes v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, 
Award, 14 July 2010, para. 112. 
84 See also RUBINS, N., The notion of Investment in International Investment Arbitration. In HORN, 
N. (Ed.), Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes. The Hague : Kluwer Law International, 2004, 
p.284 ; YALA, F., The notion of Investment in ICSID Case Law: A Drifting Jurisdictional 
Requirement? In Journal of International Arbitration, Vol. 22/2005, p. 105. 
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enterprise resident in one economy by an investor resident in another economy is 
evidence of such a relationship.”85 It shall be noted that the definition stated above 
was designed for statistical purposes, i.e. for the purposes of investment protection by 
BITs this strict threshold does not apply and the identifying criteria of lasting link and 
managerial control are determined on a case-by-case basis. 
2.3.2 EU Law 
Even after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty there is no definition of 
foreign investment provided for in primary EU law.  
2.3.2.1.1 Foreign Direct Investment 
The Lisbon Treaty has introduced the term “foreign direct investment” into 
provisions regulating the common commercial policy (Part Five (the Union’s 
External Action), Title II TFEU (Common Commercial Policy); Article 206 TFEU et 
seq.). Prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the term “direct investment” 
was used within the chapter regulating the freedom of capital movements. In fact, 
even TFEU contains the term “direct investment” in its Article 64 dealing with capital 
movements. The main distinction between the terms used in Article 207 (1) TFEU 
and Article 64 TFEU lies in the fact that Article 207 (1) TFEU is aimed at external 
action of the EU whereas Article 64 TFEU relates to the internal market. The 
mentioned distinction has implications over interpretation of the term. 
2.3.2.1.2 Interpretation of “Direct Investment” 
Interpretation of the term “foreign direct investment” found in Article 207 
TFEU means interpreting a term of EU law, which is, at the same time, frequently 
used in international law and, more importantly, refers to the EU’s external action. 
This constellation is, however, not new to EU law and the ECJ jurisprudence.  
Similar issue arose in relation with the term “trade in services” within the framework 
of the common commercial policy in which case the ECJ concluded that the term 
“trade in services” shall be interpreted in accordance with its international law 
connotations (i.e. in accordance with the international trade practice) rather than by 
reference to the interpretation of the mentioned term found in the chapter on provision 
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85 OECD, Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment, 4th edn., 2008, p. 48. 
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of services in primary EU law86.  Thus, similarly,  “the international law definition is 
more important for defining FDI within the scope of the CCP”87. 
Nevertheless, the interpretation of “direct investment” within EU law 
corresponds with the definition used in international law.88 
Additionally, the Court of Justice has already interpreted the notion of “direct 
investment”: “the concept of direct investments concerns investments of any kind 
undertaken by natural or legal persons and which serve to establish or maintain 
lasting and direct links between the persons providing the capital and the 
undertakings to which that capital is made available in order to carry out an 
economic activity. /As regards shareholdings in new or existing undertakings… the 
objective of establishing or maintaining lasting economic links presupposes that the 
shares held by the shareholder enable him, either pursuant to the provisions of the 
national laws relating to companies limited by shares or otherwise, to participate 
effectively in the management of that company or in its control.”89 
And further with regard to the distinction between direct and portfolio 
investments, the Court identifies direct investments to be “namely investments in the 
form of participation in an undertaking through the holding of shares which confers 
the possibility of effectively participating in its management and control” whereas 
portfolio investments are considered to be “investments in the form of the acquisition 
of shares on the capital market solely with the intention of making a financial 
investment without any intention to influence the management of the undertaking”90. 
The same interpretation is advocated by the Commission itself as suggested in 
the Communication: “Foreign direct investment (FDI) is generally considered to 
include any foreign investment which serves to establish lasting and direct links with 
the undertaking to which capital is made available in order to carry out an economic 
activity. When investments take the form of a shareholding this objective presupposes 
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86 CJEU Opinion 1/2008, paras. 119-121 (as cited in DIMOPOULOS, A., EU Foreign Investment Law. 
Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 42, supra ft. 168). 
87 DIMOPOULOS, A., EU Foreign Investment Law. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 42. 
88 See e.g. EECKHOUT, P., EU External Relations Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 64. 
89 Case C-446/04 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation (2006), para. 181-2. The Court referrs to 
the Capital Directive 88/361/EEC for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty (expired now), 
which comprised nomenclature and categorization of capital movements. 
90 Case C-171/08 Commision v. Portugal (2010), para. 49. See also Joined Cases C-282/04 and C-
283/04 Commission v. Netherlands (2006), para. 19; Case C-222/97 Trummer and Mayer (1999), para. 
21; Commission v. France, para. 36-37; Commission v. United Kingdom, para. 39-40. 
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that the shares enable the shareholder to participate effectively in the management of 
that company or in its control. This contrasts with foreign investments where there is 
no intention to influence the management and control of an undertaking. Such 
investments, which are often of a more short-term and sometimes speculative nature, 
are commonly referred to as "portfolio investments".91  
It might be concluded, that the definition of “foreign direct investment” as 
found in Article 207 (1) TFEU over which the EU exercises exclusive competence 
covers investments in the form of a participation in an undertaking, provided that 
there exists a lasting and direct link between the investor and the undertaking, i.e. that 
there the investor participates effectively in the management of such undertaking or is 
in control of it. To determine whether the condition of “effective participation” or 
“control” is given, a reference to national legislation might be, according to the case 
law, taken.92 
2.3.2.1.3 Other Forms of Investments 
As it was outlined in Chapter 2.2 (EU Competence), the scope of forms of 
investments to be regulated exclusively by the EU as established under Article 207 (1) 
TFEU is limited to direct investments and, though arguably, can only be extended on 
a basis of shared implied external competence. The scope of forms of investments 
covered will, therefore, depend on willingness of the EU to conclude mixed 
agreements. 
2.3.3 Concluding notes 
First, the term “foreign direct investment” was introduced to by the Lisbon 
Treaty in the common commercial policy. This term, however, covers only limited 
number of forms that a foreign investment is allowed to take under BITs. 
Second, the EU enjoys exclusive competence to regulate investments in the 
form of a participation of a third country investor in an undertaking established or 
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91 The Communication further referrs to  Judgment of 12 December 2006, Test Claimants in the FII 
Group Litigation, Case C-446/04, ECR p. I-11753, para. 181. See also e.g. the Judgments of 24 May 
2007, Holböck, C-157/05, ECR. p. I-4051, para. 34; 23 October 2007, Commission/Germany, C-
112/05, ECR p. I-8995, para. 18; 18 December 2007, Skatterverket v A, C- 101/05, para. 46; 20 May 
2008, Orange European Smallcap Fund, C-194/06, para. 100; 14 February 2008, Commission/Spain, 
C-274/06, para. 18; and 26 March 2009, Commission/Italy, C-326/07, para. 35. 
92 See also WOOLCOCK, S., The EU Approach to International Investment Policy after the Lisbon 
Treaty. Directorate-General for External Policies, 2010, p. 12: “Hence, a theoretically identical capital 
placement might be considered as portfolio investment in one state and as FDI in another.” 
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having effective seat within the EU, provided that there exists a lasting and direct link 
between the investor and the undertaking, i.e. that there the investor participates 
effectively in the management of such undertaking or is in control of it (and vice 
versa). 
Third, the actual scope of definition will depend on the nature of future EU 
IIAs. 
  
! "$!
2.4 Admission and Promotion 
2.4.1 BITs 
2.4.1.1 Freedom to regulate 
The common obligation of the contracting parties concerning the promotion 
and admission of FDI provided for in BITs states that each Contracting Party shall 
encourage and create favourable conditions for investors of the other Contracting 
Party to make investments in its territory and shall admit such investments in 
accordance with its laws and regulations. 
The provision stated above shall not be seen as a mere proclamation. Quite the 
contrary, it is to be understood as a major concession of a sovereign state, since there 
is no obligation ensuing from international law obliging states not to limit the entry of 
foreign investments into their territories. As Sornarajah puts it : “The right of a state 
to control the entry of foreign investment in unlimited, as it is a right that flows from 
sovereignty. The entry of any foreign investment can be excluded by a state. But, a 
sovereign entity can surrender its rights even over a purely internal matter by a 
treaty. Some regional and bilateral treaties now provide for the right of entry and 
establishment of investments to the national of contracting states. Where such pre-
establishment rights are created by treaty, the denial of a right to entry to any 
investor from one of the contracting parties would amount to a violation of the treaty, 
unless it can be shown that his investment is not covered by the treaty.”93. 
Nevertheless, generally speaking, BITs do not concentrate on the promotion 
and admissions, i.e. pre-entry stage much. “IIAs typically do not provide national 
treatment or most-favoured-nation treatment (MFN treatment) with respect to the 
admission or establishment of foreign investors or investments or provide other 
general rights of entry fore foreign investors or investment. Most IIAs provide 
protection only after foreign investors or investments have been admitted into the host 
state in accordance with local law.”94 
2.4.1.2 Conditions to entry 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
93  SORNARAJAH, M., The International Law on Foreign Investment. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010, p.88. See also NEWCOMBE, A., PARADELL, L., Law and Practice of 
Investment Treaties. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2009, p. 121-2. 
94 NEWCOMBE, A., PARADELL, L., Law and Practice of Investment Treaties. The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 2009, p.122. 
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Since it is the right of a sovereign state to exclude the entry of foreign 
investments completely, a host state also enjoys the right to attach conditions to such 
an entry95. “The power of exclusion implies the power to admit conditionally and 
withdraw the licence to do business where the condition is not satisfied. The rule is 
universally recognized.”96 
Such restrictions would not be in most cases explicitly stated in a BIT. In 
general, limitations on the entry of foreign investments are ensuing from national 
laws. “The law of the host state could specify the legal vehicle through which the 
foreign investment should be made, the nature of the capital resources that should be 
brought from outside the state, the planning and environmental controls that the 
manufacturing plant should be subject to, the circumstances of the termination of the 
foreign investment and other like matters.”97 
Coming hand-in-hand with financial crisis the term “investment 
protectionism” is entering the world of FDI. The major monitoring institutions expect 
intensified restrictive policies. “Achieving a balance between the sovereign right to 
regulate an industry, and the need to avoid investment protectionism, remains a 
major policy challenge. It is complicated by the fact that there is no internationally 
recognized definition of “investment protectionism”. Clarifying the term would 
require distinguishing between justified and unjustified reasons to restrict FDI. The 
motivations for FDI restrictions are manifold and include, for instance, sovereignty 
or national security concerns, strategic considerations, socio-cultural reasons, 
prudential policies in financial industries, competition policy, infant industry 
protection or reciprocity policies. In each case, countries may have very different 
perceptions of whether and under what conditions such reasons are legitimate.”98 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
95  SORNARAJAH, M., The International Law on Foreign Investment. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010, p.89. 
96  SORNARAJAH, M., The International Law on Foreign Investment. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010, p.89. 
97  SORNARAJAH, M., The International Law on Foreign Investment. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010, p.90. 
98 See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2011, p. 110 and p. 98-99 on examples of  restrictive 
measures on foreign investors in 2010/2011: „Australia rejected Singapore Exchange’s US$8.3 billion 
offer to take over Australian Securities Exchange, which it concluded was not in Australia’s national 
interest./Brazil reinstated restrictions on rural land-ownership for foreigners by modifying the way a 
law dating back to 1971 is to be interpreted. The reinterpreted law establishes that, on rural land-
ownership, Brazilian companies which are majority owned by foreigners are subject to the legal 
regime applicable to foreign companies./The Minister of Industry of Canada announced the blocking of 
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In summary, sovereign states are free to determine the level of their openness 
to foreign investment. Although, BITs provide for the obligation of contracting states 
to admit foreign investments, contracting states are free to regulate the entry via 
national legislation. What BITs do cater for is the fact that a foreign investment can 
only be dismissed on the basis of valid national legislation of a host state. 
2.4.1.3 Pre-Entry Screening 
Most BITs provide for the right of entry on the condition that investment is 
made in accordance with the laws and regulations of the host state. Thus, the right to 
entry is not an absolute right and is often subject to limitations imposed by national 
legislation as was stated above. 99 
The States might in addition institute special administrative procedures aimed 
at the screening of a potential investment before the entry into its territory, for 
instance by requiring a feasibility study. Not complying with the screening procedure 
or a dishonest conduct on the part of the investor might further result in the denial of 
protection offered by the respective treaty on the ground that the investment was 
secured illegitimately.100 
2.4.1.4 Incentives 
Encouraged by a generally accepted view that foreign investment generates 
economic growth State are likely to open up its market to foreign investment without 
much restriction. Indeed, competition among States for foreign investment and States 
are designing incentive programs to lure the potential investors into their territory. 
Such initiatives do often take the form of a single piece of legislation so that the 
investors could better acquaint themselves with the benefits on offer101. 
And, generally speaking, they are free to do so. “There is  … nothing in 
international law which prevents the granting of … tax holidays and incentives. 
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the Australian mining company BHP Billiton’s US$39 billion takeover of Potash Corp. (a Canadian 
fertilizer and mining company)” 
99  SORNARAJAH, M., The International Law on Foreign Investment. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010, p.104. Such as „made in accordance with the laws and regulations“ of the host 
state. 
100  SORNARAJAH, M., The International Law on Foreign Investment. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010, p.104. 
101  SORNARAJAH, M., The International Law on Foreign Investment. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010, p.90. 
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Whether such an incentive should be given or not is a matter that lies within the 
discretion of the state authorities.”102 
However, once a State undertakes international obligations in relation to 
foreign investments it is likely that incentive might collide with such obligations. 
There is a threat that incentives might result in discriminatory conduct or in violation 
of national treatment and most-favoured-nation treatment. “But, provided an 
adequate basis for the differential treatment, such as the need to attract certain types 
of technology or to direct the foreign investor into certain channels of production, can 
be shown, there will be no illegality involved in such discrimination.”103 Further, they 
might be in breach with the provisions of the TRIMS.104 
2.4.2 EU Law 
Granting exclusive competence to the EU over foreign direct investments 
raises questions as to what the scope of protection shall be covered within such 
conferral of power. 
In no case, however, it was disputed, that the EU exclusive competence covers 
the admission and promotion of foreign direct investments. This is supported 
primarily by the fact that the competence over foreign direct investment is part of a 
wider exclusive competence over the common commercial policy, which is aimed 
directly at eliminating trade restrictions and liberalization. 
However, the admission of foreign investments under EU law employs a 
different terminology from the one found in BITs. For better understanding of the 
subject a reference to the internal market rules shall be taken. 
Though not stated explicitly, the admission and encouragement of foreign 
investments is regulated by the provisions on the freedom of capital movements and 
the freedom of establishment. Besides the mentioned primary EU law regulation the 
admission and encouragement of foreign investments is often provided for in EU 
IIAs. 
2.4.2.1 Capital movements 
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102  SORNARAJAH, M., The International Law on Foreign Investment. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010, p.103. 
103  SORNARAJAH, M., The International Law on Foreign Investment. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010, p. 103. 
104  SORNARAJAH, M., The International Law on Foreign Investment. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010, p.103. 
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Although such conclusion is not undisputed, the EU has unilaterally 
liberalized capital movements not only within the EU but also with third countries105. 
It shall be noted, however, that no reciprocity is offered in consideration, i.e. the flow 
of capital might be restricted from the part of the relevant third country. 106  
The liberalization is grounded in Article 63 TFEU (“Within the framework of 
the provisions set out in this Chapter, all restrictions on the movement of capital 
between Member States and between Member States and third countries shall be 
prohibited.”) and comprises capital movements as specified by the ECJ case law and 
the illustrative list forms of capital movements annexed to the Directive 88/361/EEC 
mentioned above. 
The scope of Article 63 TFEU shall be interpreted broadly so as to include not 
only discriminatory measures but also measures that are “liable to dissuade” or “liable 
to deter” investors form making capital movement. 107 
Nevertheless, the liberalization is not unlimited as the EU and Member States 
have retained the right to impose restrictions in circumstances provided for in Articles 
64 to 66 TFEU.  
Even though in accordance with Article 4(2)(a) TFEU the competence in 
substantive freedoms is shared, the fact that extensive internal legislation exists in the 
field as well as the fact that the scope of Article 65 providing for restrictive measures 
to be potentially adopted by Member States, “the potential scope and content of 
Member State action is actually severely limited”. 108 
2.4.2.2 Establishment 
Under the provisions on establishment the admission of investment in the form 
of primary or secondary establishment shall be unrestricted.  The freedom, however, 
applies only to the nationals of the EU.  
Who the national of the EU is, is determined in Article 20 (1) TFEU, which 
states that: “Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen 
of the Union.” It is, however, further by Article 54 TFEU stating that: “Companies or 
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105 Upon the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. 
106 DIMOPOULOS, A., EU Foreign Investment Law. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 50-
51. 
107 DIMOPOULOS, A., EU Foreign Investment Law. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 76-
77. 
108 DIMOPOULOS, A., EU Foreign Investment Law. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 78. 
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firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and having their 
registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the 
Union shall, for the purposes of this Chapter, be treated in the same way as natural 
persons who are nationals of Member States. ‘Companies or firms’ means companies 
or firms constituted under civil or commercial law, including cooperative societies, 
and other legal persons governed by public or private law, save for those which are 
non-profit-making.” 
It transpires that the distinction between the freedom of establishment and the 
freedom of capital movements is essential. Dimopulous attempts to describe the 
difference by stating that “…freedom of capital movements does not concern the 
establishment of an FDI, but only the capital transfers relating to FDI, for example 
the act of the acquisition of shares or the transfer of dividends. The conditions under 
which the capital linked with a direct investment can be used, for example 
shareholder’s rights, is the subject matter of the freedom of establishment.”109 And 
further specifies that “regulation of establishment aims at the identification and 
gradual abolition of the domestic regulatory restrictions that impede market access to 
foreign investors, such as foreign equity ownership limitations, quantitative 
restrictions, administrative authorizations, and restrictions on the legal form of 
establishment.”110 
* 
The EU on the basis of its limited and dispersed pre-Lisbon competences 
within the field, concluded a number of international agreements on the ground of 
which the access to market was granted also to third country investors in the EU and 
vice versa. 111 
The mentioned agreements include the GATS and certain international treaties 
concluded by the EU that affect international investments such as: the European 
Economic Area Agreement (see Articles 40 to 45), the Association Agreement with 
Turkey, the Stability and Association Agreements with Balkan countries, the Euro-
Mediterranean Agreements, the Partnership and Co-operation Agreements, the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
109 DIMOPOULOS, A., EU Foreign Investment Law. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 82. 
110 DIMOPOULOS, A., EU Foreign Investment Law. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 52. 
111 DIMOPOULOS, A., EU Foreign Investment Law. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 52. 
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Association Agreements with Mexico, Chile, Korea, South Africa, CARIFORUM 
states and the Energy Charter Treaty. 
As far as the treaties affecting international investment are concerned the level 
of liberalization is not uniform and always depends on wording of the relevant treaty. 
Basically, EU IIAs provide for the extension of the four freedoms and other internal 
market rules to the other signatory in a modified scope depending on the level of 
association or cooperation intended to be attained in the respective relations between 
the signatories. 
2.4.3 Concluding notes 
First, EU law regulates the admission and promotion of investments more 
intensively than BITs. 
Second, BITs in most cases contain merely a general statement providing for 
encouragement, creation of favourable conditions for investors to make investments 
and admission of investments in accordance with its laws and regulations. The 
potential restrictions to entry as well as incentives and administrative procedures 
required prior to the entry are usually provided for in national legislation. This 
procedure is fully compatible with the sovereign right to refuse or attached conditions 
to any foreign investment. 
Third, on the other hand EU law concentrates primarily on the entry of foreign 
investments (market access, liberalization, principle of non-discrimination), although 
not explicitly referring to it as such. The relevant regulation is covered by the internal 
market rules on the freedom of capital movements, establishment and services along 
with, for instance, competition and state aid rules, which are capable of imposing 
restrictions on the entry of foreign investment. The restriction that could be imposed 
in relation to the liberalized and non-discriminatory approach required by the “four-
freedoms” rules are explicitly stated in primary EU law. The terminology mentioned 
above is likely to be found in future EU IIAs. 
Fourth, the regulation of foreign investments had been even prior to the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty provided for in EU IIAs, especially be means of 
extending the internal market rules in modified version to signatories. 
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Fifth, there is no dispute as to the competence of the EU over the market 
access of foreign directed investments under Article 207 TFEU. 
  
! #"!
2.5 Standards of Treatment and Protection 
Two sets of standards evolved in the protection of international investments: 
relative - aiming at elimination discrimination among investors on the basis of their 
nationality and absolute standards112 aiming at providing investor with a basic level 
of protection. When considering relative standards as the national treatment or most-
favoured-nation treatment one refers to two sets of conditions: the circumstance of the 
investment being discussed and the circumstances found in relation to other 
investments or investors. On the other hand, when assessing compliance with absolute 
standards one refer solely to the circumstance of the investment or investor being 
discussed without comparing the situation with the one of any other investor or 
investment.  
2.5.1 BITs 
2.5.1.1 Relative standards of treatment 
Most-favoured-nation (the “MFN”) treatment may be defined as “treatment 
accorded by the granting State to the beneficiary State, or to persons or things in a 
determined relationship with that State, not less favourable than treatment extended 
by the granting State to a third State or to persons or things in the same relationship 
with that third State.”113 
MFN complements the national treatment (the “NT”) in prohibiting 
discrimination in that that MFN extends the benefits granted to one foreign investor to 
other investors covered by the MFN clause. On the other hand, NT prevents 
discrimination of foreign investors against the domestic investors. Both are based on 
the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination in cross-border situation. 
Frequently the clauses are of the following wording: Each Contracting Party 
shall in its territory accord to investments and returns of investors of the other 
Contracting Party treatment which is fair and equitable and not less favourable than 
that which it accords to investments and returns of its own investors or to investments 
and returns of investors of any third State, whichever is more favourable. 
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112 Sometime called „non-contingent“ standard. 
113 Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, Draft Articles on Most-
Favoured-Nation Clauses, ILC Report, A/33/10, 1978, Art. 5. 
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Each Contracting Party shall in its territory accord to investors of the other 
Contracting Party, as regards management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal 
of their investment, treatment which is fair and equitable and not less favourable than 
that which it accords to its own investors or to investors of any third State, whichever 
is more favourable. 
MFN or NT clauses are, however, not to be used in relation to advantages 
accorded to foreign investors ensuing from a membership in a customs, economic, or 
monetary union, a common market or a free trade area. At the same time, obligations 
by which a member of such union is bound shall be respected by the other contracting 
party. The wording of the mentioned clauses might be, for instance, of the following 
wording: The National Treatment and Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment provisions of 
this Article shall not apply to advantages accorded by a Contracting Party pursuant 
to its obligations as a member of a customs, economic, or monetary union, a common 
market or a free trade area. 
The Contracting Party understands the obligations of a Contracting Party as 
a member of a customs, economic, or monetary union, a common market or a free 
trade area to include obligations arising out of an international agreement or 
reciprocity agreement of that customs, economic, or monetary union, common market 
or free trade area.  
2.5.1.2 Absolute standards of treatment 
There is an on-going discussion on what actually constitutes the contents of 
FET, i.e. what exactly constitutes the standard against which the measures of the host 
State shall be assessed. A range of alternative standard appears on offer: the standard 
embodied in the international minimum standard required by the customary law114, 
the standard constituted by all the international law and its sources115 or whether FET 
is an autonomous treaty standard. 
Nevertheless, a number of elements of FET can be distinguished clarifying the 
notion of FET. 
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114  Alex Genin v. The Republic of Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, 25 June 2001; Asian 
Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award of 27 June 1990; AMT v. 
Congo, Award of 21 February 1997; U.S. v. Italy (Elettronica Sicula Spa (ELSI) case), 1989 ICJ 
Reports 15. 
115 Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award of 30 August 
2000. 
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First, FET covers the obligation of vigilance and protection in relation to 
foreign investment. FET is often examined hand in hand with the principle of full 
protection and security, with the latter standard essentially arising in cases when 
foreign investment is affected by physical damage.116 
Second, FET is considered to ensure due process and protection against denial 
of justice and arbitrariness. In its broadest sense, FET is thought to cover all types of 
wrongful conduct of the State, i.e. acts or omissions of the authorities representing all 
three branches of government. When interpreted more restrictively, FET is considered 
to provide protection against improper administration of proceedings such as denial of 
access to courts, inadequate procedures or unjust decisions. In its narrowest sense, 
FET can be interpreted as a refusal of the host State to grant to the investors access to 
justice. 117 
Third, FET is thought to require transparency, respect of the investor´s 
legitimate expectation and good faith.118 
* 
Full protection and security principle (the „FSP“) does not receive as much 
attention in investment arbitrations as, for instance protection against expropriation. 
At minimum it requires “the abstention of the host state119 from interference 
with the rights of the investors, in particular violations of his or her property“, though 
it might interpreted so as to include „positive action by the host state to protect 
foreign investment through preventive and repressive action, and also against harm 
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116 Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award of 27 June 1990; 
AMT v. Congo, Award of 21 February 1997; Wena Hotels v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4. 
117OECD, International investment law: a changing landscape, p.109-110. See also U.S. v. Italy 
(Elettronica Sicula Spa (ELSI) case), 1989 ICJ Reports 15; Compagnia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. 
and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, August 20, 2007; 
Middle East Cement Shipping & Handling Co. S.A. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/99/6, Award, April 12, 2002; Ronald S. Lauder v. Czech Republic, (UNCITRAL), Award, 3 
September 2001. 
118 Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award of 30 August 
2000; Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Award, November 13, 2000; 
Tecnicas Medioambientales TECMED S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, 
Award, May 29, 2003. 
119  On determining when a harm is caused by the host state see: Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Sri 
Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award of 27 June 1990, para. 85; Saluka Investments BV v. Czech 
Republic, UNICTRAL, Partial Award, March 17, 2006, para. 490-496; Biwater Gauff Tanzania v. 
United Republic of Tanzania, ICISD Case NO. ARB/02/25, Award, July 24, 2008, para. 731. 
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caused by private actors120“. When simplified, the FSP refers to „duty to provide 
police power protection121“ and „duty to provide legal protection122“.123 
 
2.5.2 EU Law  
Besides the doubts over what forms of foreign investments shall be covered 
under Article 207 TFEU, further uncertainties arise over the scope of protection 
which is to be provided thereunder. 
There are no explicit restrictions placed on the scope of protection included in 
Article 207 TFEU. Thus, it might be argued, that “for reasons of efficiency and 
practicability (effet utile) the EU should possess the competence for all possible 
aspects of (foreign direct) investment promotion and protection”124. The argument is 
further support by the fact that the common commercial policy is no longer confined 
to trade aspects as intellectual property right as well as foreign direct investments 
were included in the policy and are strongly related to protection of property.125 
On one hand, it might be argued that the scope of the protection for which the 
competence of the EU is established under Article 207 TFEU encompasses merely 
investment liberalization 126 , i.e. market access, pre-establishment and national 
treatment, excluding post-establishment standards of treatment, protection or 
expropriation, as it forms part of the common commercial policy aimed at eliminating 
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120 On the duty of hosts state to ptotect against harm caused by other actors see Asian Agricultural 
Products Ltd. v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award of 27 June 1990, para. 26; Tecnicas 
Medioambientales TECMED S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, 
May 29, 2003, para. 176. 
121  See Tecnicas Medioambientales TECMED S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, May 29, 2003, para. 177; Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Sri Lanka, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/87/3, Award of 27 June 1990, para. 48; Wena Hotels v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/98/4, para. 84; Azurix Corp v. Argentine Republic, ICISD Cse No. ARB/01/12, Final Award, 14 
July, 2006, para. 408. 
122 See Wena Hotels v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, para. 82-4, 94-5; Ronald S. Lauder v. Czech 
Republic, (UNCITRAL), Award, 3 September 2001, para  308; CME v. Czech Republic, 
(UNCITRAL), Award, September 13, 2001, para. 356. 
123 ZEITLER, H.E., Full Protectiona and Security. In SCHILL, S.W., International Investment Law 
and Comparative Public Law. Oxford: Oxford Universtiy Press, 2010, p. 183 et seq. 
124  BUNGENBERG, M., Going global? The EU Common Commercial Policy After Lisbon. 
HEMRANN, C., TERHECHTE, J.P. (Eds.), European Yearbook of International Economic Law. 
London: Springer, 2010,  p. 144. 
125  BUNGENBERG, M., Going global? The EU Common Commercial Policy After Lisbon. 
HEMRANN, C., TERHECHTE, J.P. (Eds.), European Yearbook of International Economic Law. 
London: Springer, 2010, p. 144. 
126 See, for instance, KRAJEWSKI, M., External Trade Law and the Constitution Treaty: Towards a 
Federal and More Democratic Common Commercial Policy? Common Law Review, 2005, p. 91 et 
seq. 
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barriers to trade. Further, Article 206 TFEU127  identifies the objectives of the 
common commercial policy and it might be used when interpreting whether the 
reference to foreign direct investment should be interpreted to cover only trade-related 
aspects or the entire area of foreign direct investment.  
On the other hand, a more generous competence might be desired so as to 
enable the EU to conclude agreements resembling US free-trade agreements, in which 
case the competence granted under Article 207 TFEU would encompass market 
access, both pre- and post-establishment standards of treatment and protection, 
protection against expropriation as well as a mechanism for investor-state dispute-
settlement. 
Nevertheless, Article 207 (6) TFEU, known also as “parallelism clause”, shall 
be considered in this respect. The mentioned Article rules out the competence of the 
EU which are excluded from the power of the EU by EU legislation itself such as 
public health, cultural or social services. Therefore, the extent of such an absolute 
standard or protection offered would depend on whether the EU is entitled to take 
such measures internally.128 It view is advocated even by, for instance, Ceyssens who 
is a proponent of the EU competence under Article 207 TFEU covering both 
liberalization and investment.  Referring to the Opinion 1/95 of the CJEU, Ceyssens 
argues that since there is no internal policy providing for absolute standard treatment 
such as FET (as a different example he mentions expropriation) there is “no need to 
protect the uniformity of EU rules by conducting a common commercial policy”.129 
2.5.2.1 Primary EU law 
As the practice shows, even in its international agreements the EU tends to 
keep the terminology used in the internal market rules.  
Within the framework of primary EU law the relative standards, i.e. the 
national treatment and the most favoured nation treatment, are, though arguably, 
covered by the principle of non-discrimination.  
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127 Article 206 TFEU: „By establishing a customs union in accordance with Articles 28 to 32, the 
Union shall contribute, in the common interest, to the harmonious development of world trade, the 
progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and on foreign direct investment, and the 
lowering of customs and other barriers.” 
128 DIMOPOULOS, A., Creating an EU Investment Policy: Challenges for the Post-Lisbon Era of 
External Relations. In CARDWELL, P.J. (Ed.), EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-
Lisbon Era. The Hague: Springer, 2012, p. 408. 
129  CEYSSENS, J., Towards a Common Foreign Investment Policy? Foreign Investment in the 
European Constitution. In Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 2005, Vol. 32, No. 3, p. 281. 
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There is no explicit provision providing for NT treatment in EU primary law. 
NT is, however, covered by the EU law by the fact that Member State cannot grant to 
a national from another Member State less favourable treatment than it has offered to 
its own national or a national of a third country, or in other words, the discrimination 
on the grounds of nationality is prohibited.  
Non-discrimination is secured by the provisions on the four freedoms and the 
general prohibition of discrimination on the basis on nationality is provided for in 
Article 18 TFEU: “Within the scope of application of the Treaties, and without 
prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds 
of nationality shall be prohibited.”  
2.5.2.2 EU IIAs 
„Provisions on establishment and post-establishment treatment of FDI are 
included in the majority of EU IIAs, namely the EEA Agreement, all SAAs, all PCAs, 
the EMAs with Jordan and Algeria, and the Association Agreements with Korea, the 
CARIFORUM states, Chile, and Mexico include substantive provisions on 
establishment and post-establishment treatment of FDI. With the exception of the 
ECT, which follows the structure of BITs, EU IIAs have certain characteristics that 
differentiate them from traditional BITs.“130 
EU IIAs, in most cases, follow either the regulatory model of GATS or 
primary EU law, which makes their content in certain aspects different from BITs. 
Concerning the standards of treatment the EU IIAs are usually based on the 
principle of non-discrimination131 complemented by MFN or NT. In some EU IIAs 
there are provisions granting MFN or NT on a basis of a list of economic activities, 
i.e. on a enumerative basis. 
Besides different terminology and absence of absolute standards of treatment 
there are some other disparities between EU IIAs and BITs concerning the standards 
of treatment. For instance, EU IIAs, though not all of them, do not strictly 
differentiate between establishment and post-establishment protection, i.e. the same 
standard of treatment applies to both stages.  Further, importance shall be paid to 
actual wording of a particular EU IIA, since the definition of establishment as well as 
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131 See, for instance, Article 31 (2) of the EEA prohibiting discrimination of the operation of foreign 
investors on the basis of nationality. 
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that of capital movement may differ, i.e. be more restrictive than the definition 
applied within primary EU law.132 Additionally, some of EU IIAs are restricted to a 
specific sector.133 
As suggested by Dimopolous a specific approach shall be adopted when 
assessing the standards to treatment provided for in EU IIAs: “… an examination of 
the EU IIA provisions on the establishment and post-establishment treatment of FDI 
requires initially a determination of their specific scope; secondly, a critical 
assessment of the different standards of treatment included therein and thirdly, the 
examination of specific issues relating to establishment, such as the movement of key 
personnel.”134 
MFN could be considered to be subsumed in NT as reflected by the rules on 
non-discrimination. However, if an implied MFN clause would be applied to the 
network of BITs concluded by Member States, it might undermine the whole network 
of BITs since it would render the principles of reciprocity inherent in bilateral treaties 
useless as any investor would be able to claim the most favourable treatment 
established by one of BITs concluded by a particular Member State. See also the first 
part of this chapter on the provision contained in BITs reflecting benefits ensuing 
from membership. 
There is a question of what benefits granted to investors by other IIAs 
concluded by the host state shall be covered by MFN clause. The issue is particularly 
important since most BITs provide inter alia for investor-state arbitration as an 
available means of resolving disputes relating under particular BIT. Similarly, EU 
IIAs do not in most cases provide for the protection against expropriation whereas 
such protection is granted under BITs. In case when MFN would be interpreted 
broadly foreign investors could claim breaches of the provisions on investor-state 
arbitration or expropriation provided for by other IIAs concluded by the host state. 
Such interpretation would, however, go contrary to the principle of eiusdem 
generis principle according to which MFN clause could be used only for matters 
covered by both agreements and shall not be extended to provide access to provisions 
which are not provided for in former agreement. Therefore, MFN clause included in 
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133 Such as the GATS (limited to serrvices) and the ECT (limited to energy sector).  
134 DIMOPOULOS, A., EU Foreign Investment Law. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 148. 
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EU IIAs interpreted so as to grant the foreign investor access to, for instance, 
investor-state arbitration or the protection against expropriation provided under 
different agreement concluded by the host state.135 
For the avoidance of doubt there is an explicit provision included in the FTA 
with Korea stating that MFN clause “does not extend to the investment protection 
provisions not covered by this Chapter, including provisions relating to investor-state 
dispute settlement procedures”. 136  
Further, it should be noted that there are usually no additional standards 
provided for in EU IIAs such as FET or the principle of full protection and 
security.137“Existing EU IIAs lack an explicit reference to “absolute” standards of 
treatment, such as FET or Full Protection and Security, which are provided in BITs 
and traditional IIAs. …However, this does not mean that EU IIAs do not offer, to a 
certain extent, a similar level of protection to foreign investments and investors.”138 
2.5.3 Concluding notes 
First, there exists a great divergence between the terminology relating to the 
standards of treatment used in EU law and in BITs. EU law (especially primary EU 
law) operates with the principle of non-discrimination, whereas BITs operate with NT 
and MFN clauses. 
Second, it is argued that under EU law there are no counterparts of absolute 
standards, such as FET or FSP. 
Third, MFN and NT clause have been used in EU IIAs in most cases 
depending on the desired level of cooperation or association to be attained among the 
signatories. 
Fourth, as regards future EU IIAs the scope of protection (and therefore 
possible post-establishment regulation) is not yet settled. There are, however, no 
explicit restrictions imposed on the scope of protection to be provided under Article 
207 TFEU.  
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135 See also Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Award, November 13, 2000, 
para 38-56. 
136 DIMOPOULOS, A., EU Foreign Investment Law. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2011p. 160-1. 
137 With the exception of the ECT. 
138 DIMOPOULOS, A., EU Foreign Investment Law. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 163-
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2.6 Expropriation 
2.6.1 BITs 
The protection against expropriation arose in reaction to nationalizations and 
control of the host state over concessions and state contracts. 
Though massive expropriations and direct takings of property do not occur on 
daily basis, the protection against expropriation remains essential.  The evolution of 
notion of expropriation shall be understood in a close link with the evolution of the 
concept of property within the framework of international investment. As the concept 
of property expanded so did the concept of expropriation that now includes, besides 
the direct taking, other forms of expropriation so that it essentially includes anything 
“tantamount or equivalent” to outright taking.  
The clause on expropriation might be, for instance, of the following wording: 
Investments of investors of either Contracting Party shall not be nationalized, 
expropriated or subjected to measures having effect equivalent to nationalization or 
expropriation (hereinafter referred to as „expropriation“) in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party except for a public purpose. The expropriation shall be carried out 
under due process of law, on a non-discriminatory basis and shall be accompanied by 
provisions for the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation. Such 
compensation shall amount to the value of the investment expropriated immediately 
before expropriation or impending expropriation became public knowledge, shall 
include interest from the date of expropriation, shall be made without delay, be 
effectively realizable and be freely transferable in a freely convertible currency.  
 The investor affected shall have a right to prompt review by a judicial or 
other independent authority of that Contracting Party in which territory the 
investment has been made, of his or its case and of the valuation of his or its 
investment in accordance with the principles set out in this Article.139 
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139 In a study prepared for the EU, BITs were analysed with regard to clauses on expropriation with the 
following result: “In a study of 51 BITs completed by EU member states in the last 10 years we found a 
mixed record, with many countries such as Germany, France and the Netherlands providing protection 
against indirect expropriation in close to half of their agreements. Italy did not cover indirect 
expropriation in any of the BITs analyzed, while the UK dealt with it in only one out of seven. See table 
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The controversy arises in terms of how to deal with non-compensable regulatory issues and most IIAs 
are silent on this, with no distinction made between compensable and non-compensable regulatory 
actions. French BITs refer to ‘measures of expropriation or nationalisation or any other measures the 
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Nowadays, it is especially the regulatory expropriation, which is valued most 
by foreign investors. On the hand, it might be argued that protection against 
regulatory expropriation might limit the freedom of policy making of host states. Out 
of this reason clauses providing that legitimate government measures that are 
designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public 
health, safety and the environment, and do not constitute indirect expropriations. 
2.6.2 EU Law 
At present, the regulation of expropriation of foreign investment is not 
explicitly covered by TFEU or TEU.  
However, Article 345 TFEU states that the Treaty does not affect the right of a 
Member State to decide whether an asset should be in public or private ownership. On 
the other hand, the ECJ has ruled that measure affecting private property shall be in 
accordance with the fundamental freedoms and in compliance with EU legislation in 
general. 140  Further, the expropriation shall at all times be proportionate to the 
objective, which shall at all times be legitimate and adequate compensation shall be 
provided.141 
Further, Article 17 (Right to property) of the Charter on Fundamental Rights, 
which is of the same legal strength as the Treaties and can be invoked directly, 
provides that:  
“1. Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or 
her lawfully acquired possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her 
possessions, except in the public interest and in the cases and under the conditions 
provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for their 
loss. The use of property may be regulated by law in so far as is necessary for the 
general interest. 
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effect of which would be direct or indirect dispossession’. UK BITs cover measures ‘having effect 
equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation’, while some agreements concluded by Sweden refer to 
‘any direct or indirect measure’”. In WOOLCOCK, S., The EU Approach to International Investment 
Policy after the Lisbon Treaty. Directorate-General for External Policies, 2010, p. 37. 
140 See also Cases C-4/73 and C-84/95 as cited in DIMOPOULOS, A., EU Foreign Investment Law. 
Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 18. See also Case C-452/01 (Ospelt), para. 24; Case C-
302/97 (Konle), para. 38; and Case C-182/83 (Fearon), para. 7. 
141 Case C-182/83 (Fearon). 
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2. Intellectual property shall be protected.” 
The Communication of the Commission from July 2010 explicitly states that 
clauses on the protection against expropriation shall be part of future EU IIAs: “the 
Union should include precise clauses covering this issue into its own future 
investment or trade agreements. A clear formulation of the balance between the 
different interests at stake, such as the protection of investors against unlawful 
expropriation or the right of each Party to regulate in the public interest, needs to be 
ensured”.142 
In support of the intentions of the Commissions, it is argued that Article 345 
TFEU mentioned above shall be interpreted narrowly so as to cover only the right of 
Member States to decide freely over whether to nationalize or privatize certain assets 
and does not, therefore, preserve any exclusive rights of Member States to determine 
expropriation143, or in other words, “it is strongly argued that Article 345 TFEU 
should be narrowly construed, which, together with the broad pronouncement of FDI 
competence under Article 207 TFEU indicates that Article 207 TFEU covers also 
protection of FDI against expropriation”144 See also the chapter on the competence 
of the EU. 
Concerning EU IIAs, there is but one agreement that provide for the protection 
of expropriation – the Energy Charter Treaty. The main reason for this being that the 
ECT reflects the regulatory content of BITs rather than that of GATS or primary EU 
law. 
2.6.3 Concluding notes 
First, expropriation, especially its regulatory form, is one of the most valued 
provisions in BITs and is, especially recently, relied on heavily by foreign investors. 
Second, there is no explicit provision found in EU law granting protection 
against expropriation. However, based on the case law of the ECJ expropriation 
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142 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Towards a comprehensive 
european international investment policy”, COM(2010)343, p. 9. 
143  BUNGENBERG, M., Going global? The EU Common Commercial Policy After Lisbon. 
HEMRANN, C., TERHECHTE, J.P. (Eds.), European Yearbook of International Economic Law. 
London: Springer, 2010, p. 144. 
144 DIMOPOULOS, A., Creating an EU Investment Policy: Challenges for the Post-Lisbon Era of 
External Relations. In CARDWELL, P.J. (Ed.), EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-
Lisbon Era. The Hague: Springer, 2012, p. 408. 
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measures shall be in breach with neither the fundamental freedoms (Article 17 of the 
Charter on Fundamental Rights), nor with the provisions on the four freedoms and 
shall be at all times proportionate and compensation shall be provided. 
Third, considering that Article 345 TFEU shall be interpreted narrowly while 
at the same time Article 207 TFEU is likely to be interpreted broadly, there is no 
provision ruling out the inclusion of expropriation protection in future EU IIAs. 
Fourth, the EU is, however, cautious when it comes to providing for protection 
against regulatory expropriation as it raises concerns over the regulatory freedom. A 
mere threat of compensation paid might in result in reluctance to adopt necessary 
policies especially in fields such as environmental protection.  
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2.7 Dispute Settlement 
2.7.1 BITs 
In accordance with Article 33 of the UN Charter embodying the principle of 
free choice of means for dispute settlement, States have adopted different modes of 
settlement of disputes arising out of foreign investments - the most frequent option 
being the investor-state arbitration. 
The exact mechanism of dispute resolution will, of course, depend on the 
particular BIT. The arbitration clause contain in a BIT might provide for an 
institutionalized arbitration, such as before the ICSID, International Chamber of 
Commerce, London Court of International Arbitration etc., or opt for an ad hoc 
arbitration usually by determining applicable rules of arbitration, which is most cases 
would be the UNICTRAL arbitration rules. 
The ICSID is a forum specifically designed to settle investor-state disputes, 
operating on the basis of the Washington Agreement and enjoys general respect. 
„A few early IIAs do not provide an direct right of investor action at all, or 
they limit access to arbitration to certain specific treaty breaches, such as issues of 
expropriation and repatriation of profits. The great majority of IIAs, however, do 
provide aggrieved investors with a direct right to resort to arbitration with regard to 
any disputes arising from alleged treaty breached or more generally with regard to its 
investments.“ 
Pre-conditions to commencement of arbitration 
BITs often provide for pre-conditions, which are to be satisfied in case of a 
dispute prior to submission of the dispute before the relevant forum. BITs often 
require that negotiation or consultation take place prior to actual arbitration.145 
 
2.7.2 EU Law 
As it is perceived to be one of the essential characteristics of investment law, 
the Commission is keen on including the possibility of investor-state dispute 
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145 Ronald S. Lauder v. Czech Republic, (UNCITRAL), Award, 3 September 2001, para. 187;  Bayindir 
Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 November 2005,  para. 88-103. 
! $%!
settlement similar to one found in BITs in future EU IIAs: “Investor-state is such an 
established feature of investment agreements that its absence would in fact 
discourage investors and make a host economy less attractive than others.”146  
So far, the EU aims at ensuring consistency with EU in decisions delivered by 
tribunals in investor-state arbitrations by amicus curiae briefs.  
The main problem, however, is the fact that the CJEU has exclusive power to 
deliver opinion on the legality of measure adopted by the EU and is the only 
institution entitled to interpret EU law. Nevertheless, the CJEU has already 
recognized its jurisdiction to hear cases on alleged breaches of mixed agreements147. 
Therefore, in case future EU IIAs are concluded in form of a mixed agreements the 
CJEU would be competent to decide on violations of such treaties. The question 
remains whether third countries’ investors would find such an option attractive since 
the EU would become throughout the CJEU judex in re sua. 
Additionally, the EU is not a signatory of the ICSID Convention. Moreover, 
the Convention is open exclusively to states148, meaning that an amendment of the 
Convention would be necessary for the EU to accede to the convention. Even the 
ICSID Additional Facility Rules are available only for dispute between states and 
nationals of other states. 
The mechanisms providing for ICSID arbitration, however, can be employed 
even in future EU IIAs (i.e. when the EU assumes fully its exclusive competence and 
concludes investment agreement in replacement of the standing BITs), provided that 
there is a distinction between the responsibility of the EU and its Member States. in 
that case two situations shall be distinguished. First, in case when the disputed 
measure was taken by Member State a traditional investor-state dispute settlement 
might be employed. Second, in case when a EU measure is disputed a new 
mechanism for resolving such disputes would have to be created. 
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146 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Towards a comprehensive 
european international investment policy”, COM(2010)343, p. 10 As the main challenges the 
Commision identifies: transaprency, consitency and predictability of decisions and adequacy of 
arbitration rules. 
147  Meryem Demirel v Stadt Schwabisch Gmund, Case C-12/86; Hermes International v FHT 
Marketing Choice BV, Case C-53/96. 
148 See Article 67 of the ICSID Convention: “This Convention shall be open for signature on behalf of 
States members of the Bank…” 
! $&!
Concerning the potential use of other arbitration tribunals, especially ad hoc 
arbitrations under UNCITRAL arbitration rules, it is argued that, unlike in case of the 
ICSID arbitration the review of awards is vested with national courts. Further, the 
rules are not primarily trimmed to arbitration involving state entities, thus, for 
instance, awards rendered in such arbitration might be public – even when a public 
measure was challenged. 
The EU will further have to decide what model of provisions on arbitration 
shall be employed: the EU or rather more prescriptive US model. Besides a more 
detailed procedure there are further difference such the fact that US model provides 
for participation of non-disputing parties, transparency, open hearings or submissions 
of amicus curiae, which are not found in European BITs. 
There is a specific mechanism of dispute settlement provided for in EU IIAs. 
In most cases they follow the WTO regulatory model containing detailed procedures 
for dispute settlement. There is so far only one EU IIA that follows the settlement 
system found in BITs – the ECT149.  
2.7.3 Concluding notes 
First, direct investor-state dispute settlement is seen as the major benefit 
granted by BITs. Currently, there is no provision in EU law providing for investor-
state arbitration. 
Second, the issue of responsibility with regard to the exclusive competence 
over FDI has still not been settled. 
Third, without an amendment the ICSID is not open to the EU (or any other 
REIO). 
Forth, in case future EU IIAs are concluded as mixed agreement the CJEU 
might be competent to hear disputes arising out of breaches of such EU IIAs. 
Fifth, future EU IIAs might eventually provide for dispute-settlement to be 
conducted before other forum than the ICSID or for an ad hoc arbitration under, for 
instance, UNCITRAL arbitration rules. However, appropriateness of the mentioned 
arbitration procedures haw not yet been fully explored. 
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149 The settlement of disputes between an investor and a contracting party is provided for in Article 26. 
! $'!
3. CONCLUSION 
 
Both EU law and the network of BITs simultaneously cover the regulation of 
foreign investment. In spite of strikingly different terminology, the substantive 
coverage is essentially similar, though certain aspects crucial to investment protection 
are not explicitly provided for in EU law and, therefore, raise doubts. 
The competence of the EU over foreign direct investment granted under 
Article 207 TFEU, which is considered to be the basis for the common investment 
policy as well as future EU IIAs, raises doubts both as to the scope of forms of 
investment covered as well as the scope of protection to be provided. Despite the fact 
that Article 207 TFEU refers explicitly only to foreign direct investments it does not 
mean that the EU cannot and will not (or even should not) be competent to include 
other forms of investments in future EU IIAs (by virtue of the doctrine of implied 
powers). Most importantly, the scope of protection of foreign (direct) investments is 
not yet settled. Depending on arguments pursued the actually scope of protection 
ranges from mere market access and liberalization through regulation except for 
absolute standards and expropriation to comprehensive regulation covering all aspects 
of foreign investment regulation regularly covered by BITs. 
The term “foreign direct investment”, which is to be crucial in defining the 
scope of the common investment policy and future EU IIAs, covers only limited 
number of forms that a foreign investment is allowed to take under BITs. 
Nevertheless, effectively any form of form of investment covered by BITs might by 
covered by relevant provision of EU law (even though they are not referred to as such 
under EU law). Furthermore, even as regards future EU IIAs the definition provided 
therein might be construed in a way to provide the same coverage as BITs do. Thus, 
even though not provided for in the Treaty explicitly, the definition of foreign 
investments in future EU IIAs might essentially cover the full scope of foreign 
investments considered to be protected by BITs. 
Promotion and admission of foreign investments is regulated more intensively 
in EU law then BITs. BITs, in most cases, contain merely a general statement 
providing for encouragement, creation of favourable conditions for investors to make 
investments and admission of investments in accordance with its laws and 
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regulations. The potential restrictions to entry as well as incentives and administrative 
procedures required prior to the entry are usually provided for in national legislation. 
On the other hand, EU law concentrates primarily on the entry of foreign investments 
(market access, liberalization, principle of non-discrimination), although not explicitly 
referring to it as such. The relevant regulation is covered by the internal market rules 
on the freedom of capital movements, establishment and services along with, for 
instance, competition and state aid rules, which are capable of imposing restrictions 
on the entry of foreign investment. The restriction that could be imposed in relation to 
the liberalized and non-discriminatory approach required by the “four-freedoms” rules 
are explicitly stated in primary EU law. The terminology mentioned above is likely to 
be found in future EU IIAs. In fact, the regulation of foreign investments had been 
even prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty provided for in EU IIAs, 
especially be means of extending the internal market rules in modified version to 
signatories. Finally, there is no dispute as to the competence of the EU over the 
market access of foreign directed investments under Article 207 TFEU. 
Standards of treatment and post-entry protection of foreign investments is one 
of the most debated issues concerning the new common investment policy. First, there 
exists a great divergence between the terminology relating to the standards of 
treatment used in EU law and in BITs. EU law (especially primary EU law) operates 
with the principle of non-discrimination, whereas BITs operate with NT and MFN 
clauses. On the other hand, MFN and NT clause have been used in EU IIAs in most 
cases depending on the desired level of cooperation or association to be attained 
among the signatories. In summary, as regards future EU IIAs the scope of protection 
(and therefore possible post-establishment regulation) is not yet settled.  
There are, however, no explicit restrictions imposed on the scope of protection 
to be provided under Article 207 TFEU. 
Expropriation, though intended to be included in future EU IIAs, involves 
certain controversy. Although expropriation, especially its indirect form, is one of the 
most valued provisions in BITs and is, especially recently, relied on heavily by 
foreign investors, arguments have been raised, referring primarily to the parallelism 
clause, against inclusion of expropriation protection in future EU IIAs. However, 
based on the case law of the ECJ expropriation measures shall be in breach with 
neither the fundamental freedoms (Article 17 of the Charter on Fundamental Rights), 
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nor with the provisions on the four freedoms and shall be at all times proportionate 
and compensation shall be provided. Further, considering that Article 345 TFEU shall 
be interpreted narrowly while at the same time Article 207 TFEU is likely to be 
interpreted broadly, there is no provision ruling out the inclusion of expropriation 
protection in future EU IIAs. 
Investor-state arbitration is considered to by the major benefit to investors 
granted by BITs. However, a number of ensuing questions has yet to resolved as 
regards the possibility of the right to resort to investor-state arbitration under future 
EU IIAs: inter alia, identification of the most adequate forum, the issue of 
responsibility with regard to the EU’s exclusive competence under Article 207 TFEU, 
the exclusive competence of the CJEU to decide the question of EU law and rule on 
the legality of EU measures.  
Even though there is a great disparity in terminology employed by EU law and 
the one typical of BITs, it might be concluded that the EU is equipped sufficiently to 
cover the regulation of foreign investments to the extent covered by the present BITs 
concluded between Member States and third countries.  
On the hand, there are numerous issues, which are of high importance, and are 
still not settled. The field is a new one and not enough research has been conducted so 
far to fully cover the uncertain or controversial issues. Moreover, certain questions are 
not be to answered by legal doctrine but are more of a policy question. 
!  
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5. SUMMARY (SK) 
V rámci EU v sú*asnosti prebieha v+znamná zmena v regulácii zahrani*n+ch 
investícií spo*ívajúca v postupnom presune kompetencií z *lensk+ch &tátov na 
Európsku Úniu. Regulácia vstupu, &tandardov zaobchádzania a ochrany zahrani*n+ch 
investícií je pritom tradi*ne vnímaná ako prerogatív suverénnych &tátov. 
Plánovan+m cie,om je vytvorenie spolo*nej európskej investi*nej politiky 
(„the common investment policy“), ktorá nahradí sú*asnú nejednotnú úpravu zalo-enú 
na bilaterálnych investi*n+ch dohodách uzatvoren+ch medzi jednotliv+mi *lensk+mi 
&tátmi a tretími &tátmi („bilateral investment treaties“, .alej tie- len „BITs“) tak, ako 
to vypl!va z Oznámenia Komisie s názvom “Na ceste ku komplexnej európskej 
medzinárodnej investi!nej politike”150 prijatom v júli 2010. 27 rozdielnych jurisdikcií 
by tak malo by/ zjednoten+ch v jednej spolo*nej – celoeurópskej. 
Základná otázka znie: Je vhodnej&ie regulova/ zahrani*né investície na úrovni 
EÚ alebo na úrovni jednotliv+ch *lensk+ch &tátov? 
* 
Ku kompete*nému presunu do&lo do zna*nej miery na základ' Lisabonskej 
zmluvy151 s ú*innos/ou od 1. decembra 2009. Lisabonská zmluva, v *l. 207 odst. 1 
Zmluvy o fungovaní Európskej únie (.alej tie- len ZFEÚ)152 zverila Európskej únii 
v rámci spolo*nej obchodnej politiky v+lu*nú právomoc v oblasti priamych 
zahrani*n+ch investícií, tj. *lenské &táty nie sú na.alej, s ur*it+m v+nimkami, 
oprávnené vyvíja/ legislatívnu *innosti ani uzatvára/ medzinárodné zmluvy v oblasti 
priamych zahrani*n+ch investícií, pokia, tak nie je v+slovne stanovené v predpisoch 
EÚ alebo sa nejedná o transpozíciu práva EÚ. 
Zmenu v&ak nie je vhodné vníma/ ako radikálnu. Aj pred ú*innos/ou 
Lisabonskej zmluvy, aj ke. jej právomoc bola obmedzená a rozstrie&tená, EÚ 
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150 Oznámenie Komisie Rade, Európskemu parlamentu, Európskemu hospodárskemu a sociálnemu 
v!boru a V!boru regiónov “Na ceste ku komplexnej európskej medzinárodnej investi!nej politike”, 
KOM(2010)343 
151 Lisabonská zmluva, ktorou sa mení a dop!"a Zmluva o Európskej únii a Zmluva o zalo#ení 
Európskeho spolo!enstva, podpísaná v Lisabone 13. decembra 2007, Úradn" vestník C 306 z 17. 
decembra 2007. 
152 #l. 207 odst. 1 ZFEÚ: „Spolo!ná obchodná politika vychádza z jednotn!ch zásad, najmä vo vz"ahu 
k úpravám coln!ch sadzieb, uzavieraniu coln!ch a obchodn!ch dohôd t!kajúcich sa obchodu s tovarom 
a slu!bami, k obchodn"m aspektom du#evného vlastníctva, priamym zahrani$n"m investíciám, 
zjednocovaniu liberaliza!n"ch opatrení, v"voznej politike, ako aj k opatreniam na ochranu obchodu, 
napríklad v prípade dumpingu a subvencií. Spolo!ná obchodná politika sa uskuto!"uje v rámci zásad a 
cie!ov vonkaj"ej #innosti Únie.“ 
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smerovala k „'irokému a proaktívnemu prístupu“153 v otázke regulácie zahrani*n+ch 
investícií, ako vypl+va z mezinárodnych dohôd uzatvoren+ch EÚ zasahujúcich aj do 
regulácie zahrani*n+ch investícií a to predov&etk+m v liberalizíácii ich vstupu. 
#innos/ EÚ bola v tomto smere do ve,kej mieri podporená doktrínou SDEÚ 
o implikovan+ch právomociach. 
Simultáne teda existujú dva systémy regulácie zahrani*n+ch investícií: 
európska úprava zalo-ená na aktoch prijat+ch a medzinárodn+ch dohodách 
uzatvoren+ch EÚ a regulácia vypl+vajúca zo siete bilaterálnych investi*n+ch dohôd 
uzatvoren+ch medzi *lensk+mi a tretími &tátmi. 
* 
Akútnos/ a problemati*nost otázky je uznaná odbornou verejnos/ou hne. 
z nieko,k+ch dôvodov. Za prvé, spolo*ná obchodná politika, ktorej sú*as/ou je 
regulácia priamych zahrani*n+ch ivnestícii, je, z praktického h,adiska, 
nejdôle-itej&ou zlo-kou externej politiky EÚ. Za druhé, EÚ je v+znamn+m 
ú*astníkom medzinárodného obchodu a v rámci tohto postavenia uzatvára po*etné 
medzinárdné dohody (dvojstranné *i multilaterálne) so strategick+mi partnermi, ktoré 
zahr(ujú aj reguláciu zahrani*n+ch investícií. Za tretie, zmeny spôsobené 
Lisabonskou zmluvou zásadn+m spôsobom ovply(ujú rozdelenie právomocí medzi 
*lensk+mi &tátmi a EÚ. Za &tvrté, EÚ po*íta s vytvorením novej politiky v danej 
oblasti, tj. spolo*nej investi*nej politiky, *o vypl+va aj z doposia, prijat+ch návrhov. 
V sú*asnosti prebiehajú diskusie oh,adom rozsahu regulácie EÚ v oblasti 
zahrani*n+ch investícií a to v dvoch základn+ch úrovniach: za prvé, ktoré formy 
zahrani*n+ch investícií spadajú pod právomoc EÚ a za druhé, ak+ rozsah regulácie, tj. 
&tandardov zaobchádzania a ochrany, má EÚ právomoc v budúcich investi*n+ch 
dohodách zjednáva/.  
Objavujú sa názory, -e Lisabonská zmluva zostala „na pol ceste k spolo#nej 
investi#nej politike“,154 reflektujúc fakt, -e právomoc, tak ako je vymedzená v *l. 207 
odst. 1 ZFEÚ, nebude sta*i/ na pokrytie celej regulácie zahrani*n+ch investícií 
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153 BUNGENBERG, M., The Division of Competences Between the EU and Its Member States in the 
Area of Investment Politics. In HINDELANG, S., BUGENBERG, M., GRIEBEL, J. (Eds.), European 
Yearbook of International Economic Law. Special Issue: International Investment Law and EU Law. 
London: Springer, 2011, str. 29. 
154 SHAN, W., ZHANG, S.: The Treaty of Lisbon: Half Way toward a Common Investment Policy. In 
The Euroepan Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, no. 4, 2011, str. 1059 n.. 
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v rozsahu, v akom je zais/ovaná sú*asn+mi bilaterálnymi investi*n+mi dohodami 
uzatvoren+mi medzi *lensk+mi a tretími &tátmi. 
Predkladaná práca túto otázku bli-&ie analyzuje s úmyslom dospie/ k záverom 
o shode *i rozdielnosti regulácie poskytovanej BITs a právom EÚ, resp. odpovede na 
otázku, *i sú*asná úprava práva EÚ umo-(uje pokrytie regulácie zahrani*n+ch 
investícií v rozsahu poskytovanom BITs. Za t+mto ú*elom sa práca sústre.uje na 
identifikovanie rozdielov medzi úpravou zahrani*n+ch investícií pod,a BITs a pod,a 
práva EÚ. 
* 
Jadro predkladanej práce je *lenené do 7 kapitol. 
Kapitola 2.1 („Current State of Affairs“) stru*ne sumarizuje aktuálny stav – 
reflektuje plány Komisie vytvori/ spolo*nú investi*nú politiku a otázku, do akej mieri 
poskytuje Lisabonská zmluva základ pre jej realizáciu; úvádza hlavné dôvody 
aktuálnosti problematiky. 
Kapitoly 2.2 a- 2.7 sú venované samotnej úprave zahrani*n+ch investície 
právom EÚ a BITs a ich porovnaniu. 
V kapitole 2.2 („EU Competence“) je analyzovaná kompetencia EÚ v oblasti 
zahrani*n+ch investícií, pri*om primárne sa sústre.uje na jej post-lisabonské 
vymedzenie a z neho plynúce dopady na budúce medzinárodné investi*né dohody 
uzatvárané EÚ („international investment agreements“, .alej tie- len „EU IIAs“) 
v rámci spolo*enej investi*nej politiky. 
Hlavná *as/ práce je venované jednotliv+m prvkom mezinárodného 
investi*ného práva a ich úprave v oboch regulatórnych systémoch, tj. v práve EÚ 
a BITs.  
Kapitola 2.3 („Defining Investment“) skúma rozsah úpravy BITS a práva EÚ 
v súvislosti s definíciou zahrani*nej investície v ich úpravách. Kapitola 2.4   
pojednáva o podpore a vstupe zahrani*n+ch investícií. Kapitola 2.5 („Standards of 
Treatment and Protection“) sa zameriava na &tandardy zaobchádzania a rozsah 
poskytovanej ochrany po vstupe investície. Kapitola 2.6 („Expropriation“) sa 
sústre.uje na problematiku vyvlastnenia. A kapitola 2.7 („Dispute Settlement“) 
analyzuje prostriedky rie&enia sporov dostupné investorom pod,a BITs a práva EÚ. 
! %%!
Vy&&ie uvedené kapitoly sú zvlá&/ *lenené tak, aby bolo o ka-dom prvku 
pojednané z poh,adu BITs a z poh,adu práva EÚ. V niektor+ch oblastiach je 
pozornos/ venovaná tie- úprave obsiahnutej v u- existujúcich EU IIAs a to 
predov&etk+m z dôvodu, -e nazna*ujú mo-nú úpravu v budúcich EU IIAs 
uzatváran+ch v rámci spolo*nej investi*nej politiky. 
Závery dosiahnuté v jednotliv+ch kapitolách, tj. Právomoc EÚ („EU 
Competence“), Definovanie investície („Defining Investment“), Vstup a podpora 
(„Admission and Promotion“), !tandardy zaobchádzania a ochrana („Standards of 
Treatment and Protection“), Vyvlastnenie („Expropriation“) a Rie&enie sporov 
(„Dispute Settlement“), sú zhrnuté v sumarizujúcich poznámkach na konci ka-dej 
kapitoly, pri*om tieto identifikujú hlavné rozdiely v úprave zahrani*n+ch ivnestícií 
pod,a BITs a pod,a práva EÚ a ich mo-né dopady na spolo*nú investi*nú politiku 
a budúce EU IIAs.  Anal+za obsiahnutá v predkladanej práci, samozrejme, nie je 
vy*erpávajúca. 
* 
Právomoc EÚ. V+chodiskov+m princípom zostáva, -e právomoc EÚ je 
limitovaná, tj. zalo-ená na princípe prenosu právomocí, *o znamená, -e EÚ mo-e 
kona/ len na základ' Zmlúv. Právomoc, pre ktorú nie je v Zmluvách právny základ, 
zostáva v kompetenci *lensk+ch &tátov. Tento princíp je obsiahnut+ v *l. 5 odst. 2 
ZEÚ („Pod!a zásady prenesenia právomocí Únia koná len v medziach právomocí, 
ktoré na !u preniesli "lenské #táty v zmluvách na dosiahnutie cie$ov v nich 
vymedzen!ch. Právomoci, ktoré na Úniu neboli v zmluvách prenesené, zostávajú 
právomocami !lensk"ch #tátov.“) a uplatní sa na právomoc prijíma/ interné akty ako 
aj na právomoc uzatvára/ medzinárodné dohody.  
Po ur*ení existencie právomoci EÚ v danej oblasti je potrebné ur*i/ jej 
charakter, pri*om druhy právomoci vymedzujú *l. 3 a- *l. 6 ZFEÚ ako zdie,ané 
kompetencie EÚ a *lensk+ch &tátov 155 , v+lu*né kompetencie EÚ 156  a podporné, 
doplnkové a koordina*né kompetencie EÚ157.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
155 Do tejto kategórie spadá vä*&ina pravomocí EÚ. Je zalo-ené na princípe rozhodovanie *lensk+ch 
&tátov v prípade, -e rozhodnutie neprijme EÚ. Ak bolo rozhodnutie prijaté na európskej úrovni, *lenské 
&táty viac v rozsahu pokrytom európskou legislatívou kona/ nemô-u (pokia, opak v+slovne nevypl+va 
z predpisu EÚ alebo sa nejedná o implementáciu predpisov EÚ). Akty a predpisy EÚ msia by/ v súlade 
s princípom subsidiarity a proporcionality. Viz. *l. 4 ZFEÚ. 
! %&!
V oblasti priamych zahrani*n+ch investícií má EÚ v súlade s *l. 207 odst. 1 
ZFEÚ („Spolo!ná obchodná politika vychádza z jednotn"ch zásad, najmä vo vz#ahu k 
úpravám coln!ch sadzieb, uzavieraniu coln!ch a obchodn!ch dohôd t!kajúcich sa 
obchodu s tovarom a slu!bami, k obchodn!m aspektom du"evného vlastníctva, 
priamym zahrani!n"m investíciám, zjednocovaniu liberaliza!n"ch opatrení, v"voznej 
politike, ako aj k opatreniam na ochranu obchodu, napríklad v prípade dumpingu a 
subvencií. Spolo!ná obchodná politika sa uskuto!"uje v rámci zásad a cie#ov 
vonkaj!ej "innosti Únie.“) a *l. 3 odst. 1 písm e) ZFEÚ: („Únia má v!lu"nú právomoc 
v t"chto oblastiach: … e) spolo#ná obchodná politika.” (relevantná *as/)) v+lu*nú 
právomoc.  
Pokia, ide o uzatvárenie medzinárodn+ch dohôd rozsah v+lu*nej právomoci 
EÚ stanoví *l. 3 odst. 2 ZFEÚ: „Únia má tie! v"lu#nú právomoc uzavrie$ 
medzinárodnú dohodu, ak je jej uzavretie ustanovené v legislatívnom akte Únie alebo 
ak je jej uzavretie potrebné na to, aby Únia mohla vykonáva! svoju vnútornú 
právomoc, alebo ak mô!u by" uzavretím zmlúv dotknuté spolo#né pravidlá alebo 
pozmenen! rozsah ich pôsobnosti.“ 
V+lu*ná právomoc EÚ v oblasti priamych zahrani*n+ch investícií, tak ako ju 
vymedzujú *l. 207 (1) ZFEÚ a *l. 3 dost. 2 ZFEÚ, je neur*itá v dvoch základn+ch 
otázkách: za prvé, neur*it+ je rozsah foriem zahrani*n+ch investícií, ktoré by EÚ 
teoreticky mala/mohla v rámci spolo*nej investi*nej politiky, resp. budúcich EU IIAs, 
regualova/ a za druhé, neur*it+ je rozsahu regulácie, tj. *o v&etko oh,adom 
zahrani*n+ch investícií má EÚ právomoc regulova/ -  má sa obmedzi/ len reguláciu 
vstupu alebo má zahrani*né investície regulova/ aj po ich vstupu, napr. formou 
stanovenia &tandardov zaobchádzania, príp. ochrany proti vyvlastneniu *i formou 
poskytnutia práva diagonálnej arbitrá-e medzi investorom a hos/ujúcim &tátom? 
Je mo-né uzavrie/, -e, pokia, ide o formy investícií zahrnuté v+lu*nou 
kompetenciou, EÚ má v+lu*nú právomoc regulova/ len priame zahrani*né investície. 
Regulácia in+ch foriem zahrani*n+ch investícií spadá do kategórie zdie,an+ch 
právomocí a ich regulácia bude, pravebodobne, vy-adova/ uzatváranie tzv. 
zmie&an+ch dohôd. 
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156 Princíp v+lu*n+ch kompetencií EÚ vychádza z predpokladu, -e v niektor+ch oblastiach je postup na 
úrovni EÚ efektívnej&í ne- samostan+ postup *lensk+ch &tátov. Viz. *l. 3 ZFEÚ. 
157 EÚ vykonáva lenpodpornú *i koordina*nú *innos/, pri*om rozhodovanie zostáva na úrovni 
*lensk+ch &tátov. Viz. *l. 5 a *l. 6 ZFEÚ. 
! %'!
Pokia, ide o otázku rozsahu následnej regulácie, tj. &tandardov zaobchádzania 
a ochrany, *l. 207 odst. 1 ZFEÚ nestanoví -iadne limity. Otázka je interpreta*ne 
otvorená a názory sa rôznia: od re&triktívneho v+kladu obmedzujúceho v+lu*nú 
právomoc EÚ len na liberalizáciu vstupu investícií, cez pripustenie regulácie 
s vylú*ením úpravy otázok, pre ktoré nie je daná paralela v rámci vnútorn+ch 
právomocí EÚ (*l. 207 odst. 6 ZFEÚ), tj. pod,a niektor+ch názorov (napr. Ceyssens) 
je z v+lu*nej právomoci EÚ vylú*ena úprava vyvlastnenie a absolútnych &tandardov 
typu, a- po &irok+ v+klad v+lu*nej právomoci, ktor+ by, v súlade s princípom effet 
utile, umo-nil EÚ uzatvára/ medzinárodné dohody v oblasti priamych zahrani*n+ch 
investícií v rozsahu zais/ovanou BITs, tj. vrátane následnej regulácie &tandardov 
zaobchádzania, ochrany proti vyvlastneniu a mechanizmov rie&enie ivnesti*n+ch 
sporov aj formou diagonáln+ch arbitrá- priamo medzi investorom a hos/ujúcim 
&tátom. 
Definícia investície. S relatívne dostato*nou ur*itos/ou je mo-né stanovi/ 
v+lu*nú právomoc EÚ len pre priame zahrani*né investície. Pojem priamej 
zahrani*nej investície je, v súlade so Stanoviskom súdu 1/2008, vhodné interpretova/ 
v súlade s v+znamom, ktor+ je pojmu pripisovan+ v medzinárondom práve, skôr ne- s 
v+znamom, ktor+ mu pripisuje právo EÚ, *o v&ak v danom prípade nie je nijak 
rozhodujúce, vzh,adom na to, -e pojem priamej zahrani*nej investície sa 
v medzinárdnom ivnesti*nom práve, rovnako ako aj v práve EÚ, v základn+ch rysoch 
interpretuje ako ú*as/ zahrani*ného investora na podniku v hos/ujúcom &táte, pri*om 
dôraz sa kladie na dlhodobos/ vz/ahu a existenciu vplyvu na chod podniku, ktor+ sa 
ur*uje, napríklad, na základe (percentuálnej) ve,kosti podielu zahrani*ného investora 
na podniku. Ú*elom t+chto kritérií je odlí&i/ priamu investíciu od portfóliovej 
investície, ktorá je, naopak charakterizovaná krátkodobos/ou daného vz/ahu, ú*elom 
ktorého nie je ovplyv(ova/ chod podniku (ako napríklad v prípad' krátkodobého 
nákupu akcií na burze). 
Z *l. 207 odst. 1 ZFEÚ nevypl+va v+lu*ná právomoc EÚ pre iné ne- vy&&ie 
uvedené formy investície, ako napríklad portfóliové investície, koncesie, práva 
du&evného vlastníctva *i smluvn' zalo-ené práva, ktoré sú predmetom ochrany pod,a 
BITS. To v&ak neznamená, -e EÚ nemá právomoc regulova/ aj tieto prípadné iné 
formy zahran*in+ch investícií. K zalo-eniu právomoci pre ka-dú inú formu investície 
ne- priamu v&ak bude potrebn+ príslu&n+ právn+ základ.  
! %(!
Na tomto mieste je vhodné uvies/, -e v rámci vnútorného trhu, tj. v rámci 
zahrani*n+ch investícií realizovan+ch medzi *lensk+mi &támi navzájom, EÚ 
disponuje kompetenciami regulova/ aj iné ne- priame zahrani*né investície a to na 
základe ustanovení upravujúcich základné slobody, tj. predov&etk+m vo,n+ pohyb 
kapitálu (vo vz/ahu k portfóliov+m investíciám a niekotr+m smluvn+m právam, ktoré 
sú pova-ované za investíciu pod,a BITs), slobodu usadzovania (predov&etk+m vo 
vz/ahu k regulácii investície po vstupe) a slobodu poskytova/ slu-by (vo vz/ahu 
k smluvám uzatvoren+m medzi investorom a &tátom v obalsti poskytovania slu-ieb 
a vo vz/ahu ku koncesiám). 
Príslu&né ustanovenia regulujúce vnútorn+ trh v&ak nespokytujú priamy základ 
pre kompetenciu EÚ uzatvára/ v dan+ch prípadoch medzinárodné dohody upravujúce 
predmetné aspekty vo vz/ahu k ob*anom, resp. investorom, z tretích zemí.  
Judikatúra Súdneho dvora EÚ vymedzila okolnosti, za ktor+ch vzniká tzv. 
implikovaná právomoc EÚ uzatvára/ v ur*itej oblasti medzinárodné dohody aj 
v prípade, -e tak nie je v+slovne stanovené v Zmluvách. Do Lisabonskej zmluvy 
vstupu v ú*innos/ bola doktrína implikovan+ch právomocí zalo-ená v+lu*ne na 
judikatúre.  
Lisabonská zmluva sa pokúsila závery judikatúry kodifikova/ a to konkrétne 
v *l. 216 odst. 1 ZFEÚ pre implikovanú právomoc uzatvára/ medzinárodné dohody 
obecn' a v *l. 3 odst. 2 ZFEÚ pre v+lu*nú implikovanú kompetenciu. 
V+lu*ná implikovaná externá kompetencia EÚ je pod,a *l. 3 odst. 2 ZFEÚ 
daná v prípade, -e: 
I. „uzavretie medzinárodnej dohody je ustanovené v legislatívnom akte 
Únie, alebo 
II. uzavretie medzinárodnej dohody je potrebné na to, aby Únia mohla 
vykonáva) svoju vnútornú právomoc, alebo 
III. uzavretím zmlúv mô*u by) dotknuté spolo#né pravidlá, alebo 
pozmenen" rozsah ich pôsobnosti.“ 
Implikovaná právomoc EÚ (v tomto prípad' zdie,anej povahy) je pod,a *l. 
216 odst. 1 ZFEÚ daná v prípade, -e: 
I. „to ustanovujú zmluvy, alebo 
! &*!
II. je uzavretie dohody potrebné na dosiahnutie jedného z cie!ov 
stanoven!ch zmluvami v rámci politík Únie, alebo  
III. je uzavretie dohody ustanovené v právne záväznom akte Únie, alebo 
IV. sa uzavretie dohody mô!e dotknú" spolo#n$ch pravidiel alebo 
pozmeni! ich pôsobnos!.“ 
V+lu*nú kompetenciu EÚ pri aplikácií vy&&ie uveden+ch pravidiel na úpravu 
základn+ch slobôd v rámci vnútorného trhu nie je mo-né dovodi/ nako,ko uzavretie 
medzinárodnej dohody nie je predpokladané Zmluvami ani in+m legislatívnym aktom 
EÚ a taktie- nie je potrebné k tomu, aby EÚ mohla vykonáva/ vnútornú kompetenciu 
a uzavretím zmlúv by taktie- neboli dotknuté spolo*né pravidlá, príp. pozmenen+ ich 
rozsah.  
Pri porovnaní *l. 216 odst. 1 ZFEÚ a *l. 3 odst. 2 ZFEÚ je mo-né dôjs/ k 
záveru, -e EÚ mô-e uzavrie/ dohodu potrebnú na dosiahnutie jedného z cie,ov 
stanoven+ch zmluvami v rámci politík EÚ, av&ak vzh,adom na to, -e toto ustanovenie 
*l. 216 ZFEÚ nemá ekvivalent v *l. 3 odst. 2 ZFEÚ, nie je mo-né v danom prípade 
dovodi/ v+lu*nú externú implikovanú kompetenciu EÚ.  Tj. v prípade, -e je uzavretie 
medzinárodnej dohody potrebné na dosiahnutie cie,a stanoveného zmluvami pro 
niektorú z politík, má EÚ právomoc dohodu uzavrie/; táto právomoc v&ak bude 
zdie,aná. 
V tomto prípade v&ak opä/ nie je mo-né u*ini/ jednozna*n+ záver, -e prijatie 
dohody, ktorá by okrem priamych zahrani*n+ch ivnestícií zah0(ala aj iné formy be-ne 
pokryté BITs, je potrebná na dosiahnutie cie,a stanoveného Zmluvami pro spolo*nú 
obchodnú politiku. Ciele spolo*nej obchodnej politiky sú vymedzené v *l. 206 ZFEÚ 
a v *l. 21 ZEÚ.  
S vedomím neistoty oh,adom u*in'n+ch záverov, je mo-né kon&tatova/, -e 
EÚ je v prípadn+ch budúcich EU IIAs nadaná právomocou regulova/ aj iné formy 
zahrani*n+ch investícií ne- priame. Bude tak *ini/ síce na základe *l. 216 odst. 1 
ZFEÚ ale zárove( mimo *l. 3 odst. 2 ZFEÚ, tj. jej právomoc je daná, av&ak bude 
zdie,aná. V prípade, -e sa EÚ rozhodne okrem priamych regulaova/ aj iné formy 
zahrani*n+ch ivnestícií bude tak *ini/ v rámci zdie,anej kompetencie a teda formou 
zmie&an+ch dohôd. 
! &)!
Vstup a podpora zahrani*n+ch investícií. BITs sa primárne nesústre.ujú na 
vstup na podporu zahrani*n+ch investícií. Ich releventné ustanovenia sa obmedzujú 
na záväzok vytvára/ priaznivé podmienky pre vstup zahrani*n+ch ivnestícií 
a pripú&/a/ investícií v súlade s vnútro&tátnymi právnymi predpismi, tj. podmienky 
vstupu a prípadné obmedzenia *i podpory sú upravené predov&etk+m v národnej 
legislatíve. !táty si tak ponechali &irokú mieru volnosti regulácie (ktorá v&ak mô-e 
by/ obmedzená in+mi mezinárodn+mi závazkmi, ktoré &táty prevezmú, napr. 
obmedzeniami vypl+vajúcimi z práva EÚ). 
Na rozdiel od BITs, právo EÚ sa tradi*ne zameriavalo predov&etk+m na 
liberalizáciu investícií, tj. na odstrá(ovanie preká-ok vstupu na trh hos/ujúceho &tátu. 
Právov EÚ v&ak v tomto smere operuje s in+m pojmov+m aparátom ne- 
medzinárodné právo. Liberalizácia invesícií v rámci EÚ prebieha na základe princípu 
nediskriminácie.  Princíp nediskriminácie je predov&etk+m prostriedkom tvorby a 
realizácie vnútorného trhu EÚ. V tomto prípade je z h,adiska úpravy vstupu 
a podpory zahrani*n+ch investícií vhodné zamera/ sa na u- uzavreté EU IIAs. 
Pravidlá základn+ch slobôd vnútorného trhu zalo-ené na princípe nediskriminácie sú 
v EU IIAs roz&írované na ob*anov, resp. investorov a investície z tretích &tátov, a to 
v rôzne modifikovanom rozsahu v závislosti na miere plánovanej 
integrácie/kooperácie medzi EÚ a príslu&nou zmluvnou stranou. 
!tandardy zaobchádzania. !tandardy zaobchádzania predstavujú reguláciu 
zahrani*n+ch investící primárne po ich vstupe na územie hos/ujúceho &tátu, tj. 
sústre.ujú sa na následn+ vz/ah (tj. vz/ah po vstupe *i zriadení ivnestície) 
hos/ujúceho &tátu k zahrani*nej investícii po dobu jej existencie. BITs tento vz/ah 
upravujú pomocou relatívnych a absolútnych &tandardov zaobchádzania so 
zahrani*n+mi investíciami. Relatívne &tndardy sú zalo-ené na zabezpe*ení 
nediskrimina*nej ochrany zahrani*n+ch investícií vo vz/ahu k in+mi zahrani*n+mi 
investorom (tzv. dolo-ka najvy&&ích v+hod („most-favoured-nation clause“ 
(„MFN“))), rovnako ako aj vo vz/ahu k domácim investorom (tzv. dolo-ka národného 
zaobchdázania („national treatment clause“ („NT“))). Aboslútne &tandardy, tj. 
napríklad, princíp riadneho a spravodlivého zaobchádzania („fair and equittable 
treatment“ („FET“),  princíp plnej ochrany a bezpe*nosti („principle of full 
protection and security“), zahrani*n+m investorom zaru*ujú ur*it+ základn+ &tandard 
aplikovate,n+ na v&etk+ch investorov bez oh,adu na &tát ich pôvodu.  
! &+!
Úprava &tandardov zaobchádzania je jadrom BITs, a zárove( jedn+m 
z hlavn+ch rozdielov medzi úpravou zahrani*n+ch investícií pod,a BITs a pod,a 
práva EÚ. Právo EÚ zahrani*n+m investíciám, resp. investorom -iaden základn+ 
&tandard zaobchádzania, resp. ochrany, neposkytuje.  
Otázkou zostáva, *i v rámci spolo*nej investi*nej politiky, a teda v rámci 
budúcich EU IIAs, má by/ ur*it+ základn+ &tandard poskytnut+, a ak áno, tak ak+. 
Vznesené argumenty sú najmä koncep*ného charakteru a rie&ia mieru 
zainteresovanosti EÚ na regulácii a ochrane zahrani*n+ch investícií po ich vstupe, 
resp. zalo-ení. 
Argumenta*ne je mo-né podlo-i/ obmedzenie spolo*nej investi*nej politiky 
len na obchodné aspekty regulácie zahrani*n+ch investícií, tj. len na vnútornú 
a vonkaj&iu úpravu podmienok vstupu investície na vnútorn+ trh EÚ zalo-enú 
predov&etk+m na princípe nediskriminácie. Regulácia obmedzená na obchodné 
aspekty zahrani*n+ch investícií by tak neupravovala následnú reguláciu zahrani*n+ch 
investícií, tj. reguláciu po vstupu, resp. vzniku investície, ani jej ochranu, *i u- formu 
ochrany proti vyvlastneniu a zakotvením princípov kompenzácie, alebo priznáním 
práva investorovi obráti/ sa s nárokom priamo proti hos/ujúcemu &tátu 
prostredníctvom investi*nej arbitrá-e. V prospech tohoto re&triktívneho v+kladu je 
mo-né argumentova/ predov&etk+m systematick+m zaradením kompetencie EÚ 
v oblasti zahrani*n+ch investícií do spolo*nej obchodnej politiky, ktorá sa tradi*ne 
zameriava na liberalizáciu vstupu na trhu bez následnej regulácie, tj. bez &peciálnej 
úpravy vz/ahu prijímjúceho &tátu k tovaru (v rámci tradi*nej obchodnej politiky) po 
jeho prepustení do vnútorného trhu. Av&ak, samotná spolo*ná obchodná politika 
prechádza koncep*nou zmenou a roz&iruje sa i o úpravu, ktorá prekra*uje tradi*né 
limity liberalizácie obchodu s tovarom (napríklad roz&írenie spolo*nej obchodnej 
politiky o obchdoné aspekty du&evného vlastníctva *i obchod so slu-bami). Taktie- 
na pôde WTO, ktorá je zameraná na obchodnú politiku, do&lo, síce k neúspe&nému, 
pokusu o medzinárodnú dohodu v oblasti zahrani*n+ch ivnestícií. Naviac, následná 
regulácia taktie- mo-e ovplyvni/ rozhodnutie potenciálneho investora investova/ 
v ur*itom &táte, tj. vy&&í &tandard ochrany a vy&&ia miera právnej istoty mô-u 
investorov motivova/ k realizácii investície práve v rámci ústretového právneho 
prostredia. Hranica medzi liberalizáciou vstupu investícií a ich následnou reguláciou 
nemusí by/ v-dy striktne rozlí&ená. 
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 Rozsah kompetencie EÚ pod,a *l. 207 ZFEÚ je tie- mo-né vymedzi/ na 
základe tzv. paraleliza*nej dolo-ky obsiahnutej v *l. 207 odst. 6 ZFEÚ, ktorá stanoví, 
-e „v!konom právomocí prenesen!ch t!mto "lánkom v oblasti obchodnej politiky nie 
je dotknuté rozdelenie právomocí medzi Úniou a !lensk"mi #tátmi a tento v"kon 
nepovedie k harmonizácii zákonov alebo in!ch právnych predpisov "lensk!ch #tátov, 
pokia! zmluvy takúto harmonizáciu vylu"ujú.“ Argumentácia vychádza 
z predpokladu, -e *l. 207 odst. 6 zakladá paralelu medzi vnútornou a vonkaj&ou 
právomocou EÚ, tj. vylu*uje kompetenciu EÚ regulova/ v rámci obchdonej politiky 
ibalsti, ktoré sú zmluvami *i in+mi aktami EÚ vy(até z pôsobnosti EÚ. Na základe 
tejto klauzule je nietkor+mi autormi dovodzované vylú*enie právomoci EÚ regulova/ 
v rámci spolo*nej obchdonej politiky ochranu proti vylvastneniu *i úpravu &tandardu 
riadneho a spravodlivého zaobchádzania, ktoré, je argumentované, nemajú ekvivalent 
v rámci vnútorn+ch kompetencií EÚ. 
Extenzívny v+klad ustanovenia *l. 207 odst. 1 ZFEÚ smeruje k zalo-eniu 
komeptencie EÚ, ktorá by ju opráv(ovala uzatvára/ dohody v rozsahu dohôd 
o zónach vo,ného obchodu uzatváran+ch USA. Regulácia zahrani*n+ch ivnestícií 
v rámci spolo*nej investi*nej politiky by následne zah0(ala úpravu vstupu investície, 
&tandardov zaobchádzania s investíciou pred aj po vstupe na trh, ochranu investície 
vrátane ochrany proti vyvlastneniu a mechanizmu rie&enia sporov na diagonálnej 
úrovni investor-&tát.  
Do akej mieri bude EÚ zaru*ova/ vy&&ie uvedené nároky investora je otázne. 
#l. 207 odst. 1 ZFEÚ -iadne limity na rozsah následnej regulácie a ochrany 
nestanoví.  
Vy&&ie uvedené koncep*né otázky nie sú jedin+m nedorie&en+m aspektom 
otázky rozsahu regulácie zahrani*n+ch investícií pod,a *l. 207 odst. 1. ZFEÚ.  
Problémom je tie- nejednozna*nos/ vymedzenia FET. Princíp je 
v medzinárodnom práve vykladan+ &iroko. #asto sa interpretuje v súvislosti 
s princípom plnej ochrany a bezpe*nosti, pri*om- hlavn+ rozdiel spo*íva v orientácii 
neskôr uvedeného princípu na fyzickú ochranu investície. FET zah0(a tie- ochranu 
proti odmietnutiu poskytnutiu spravodlivosti a zaistenie spravodlivého procesu (od 
re&triktívneho v+kladu obmedzujúceho FET na odmietnutie prístupu k spravodlivosti 
a- po extenzívny v+klad zahr(ujúci nesprávny postup &tátu prostredníctvom 
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ktorejko,vek z jeho zlo-iek). Obsahom FET mô-e by/ aj po-iadavka na 
transparentnos/, ochranu legitímnych o*akávaní *i dobrej viery investora.  
Vyvlastnenie. Ochrana proti vyvlastneniu je tradi*n+m prvkom ochrany 
poskytovanej BITs. Predov&etk+m regulatórne vyvlastnenie je jedn+m z investormi 
naj*astej&ie vyu-ívan+ch ustanovení. K od(atiu majetku na základe regula*n+ch 
opatrení dochádza v rámci regula*nej právomoci &tátov, napríklad, v da(ovej oblasti 
*i  v oblasti ochrany -ivotného prostredia, pri*om k poklesu hodnoty investície 
dochádza bez toho, -e by sa investorovi znemo-nil v+kon jeho vlastníckych práv.158 
Okrem regulatórnej expropriácie teória .alej rozli&uje priame od(atie majetku, ktoré 
poskytuje prípady znárodnenia majetku investorov a spo*íva v od(atí vlastnického 
titulu alebo fyzického od(atia majetku a nepriame od(atie majetku, tzv. „plí-ivé 
vyvlastnenie“, ke. dochádza k postupnému obmedzovaniu vlastnick+ch práv 
investora v kone*nom dôsledku vedúceho a- k strate vlastníckeho titulu. 
V otázka vyvlastnenia je prístup EÚ zdr-anliv+ a to predov&etk+m vo vz/ahu 
k regulatórnemu vyvlastneniu. Jedná se predov&etk+m o problematiku zachovania 
autonómie politík EÚ v oblastiach zdravia, bezpe*nosti *i -ivotného prostredia, 
avzh,adom na to, -e regulatórna *innos/ EÚ v dan+ch oblastiach by v ur*it+ch 
prípadoch mohla naplni/ znaky vyvlastnenia na základe regula*n+ch opatrení.  
Rie&enie sporov. BITs investorom poskytujú okrem hmotnoprávn+ch nárokov 
tie- nároky procesné, a to predov&etk+m právo investora rie&i/ prípadn+ spor 
vypl+vajúci z poru&enia BITs formou arbitrá-e proti hos/ujúcemu &tátu. Investor má 
vo vä*&ine prípadov na v+ber od vyu-itia miestnych súdov hos/ujúceho &tátu a- po 
predlo-eniu sporu pred Stredisko pre rie&enie sporov z medzinárodn+ch investícií 
(„International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes“, („ICSID“)). 
Z poh,adu práva EÚ predstavuej práve zavedenie mo-nosti priameho 
uplatnenia nároku investora vo*i hos/ujúcemu &tátu najkomplexnej&iu otázku. 
Subjetivita EÚ je novinkou Lisabonskej zmluvy a sama EÚ priznáva, -e na poli 
rie&enie sporov je nov+m hrá*om. 
Otvorená zostáva otázka vo,by vhodného fóra. ICSID, pokia, nedôjde 
k zmene Washingtonskej dohody, je otvoren+ len &tátom – EÚ, ako regionálna 
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158 Viz. tie- napr. BRONWLIE, I., Public International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003; 
NEWCOMBE, A.: The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in International Law. In ICSID 
Review, 2005. 
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integra*ná ekonomická organizácia, k dohode pristupi/ nemô-e. #o sa t+ka ostatn+ch 
arbitrá-nych fór je otázna ich vhodnos/ pre rie&enie investi*n+ch sporov 
predov&etk+m v otázkach publicity.  
Nejasn+ je tie- model mechanizmu rie&enia prípadn+ch sporov. EÚ má na 
v+ber medzi americk+m modelom detailnej úpravy a európskym, regula*ne 
úspornej&ím modelom. Pravdou zostáva, -e na rozdiel od európskych BITs, americká 
modelová BITs naviact o&etruje tie- ú*as/ nesporn+ch strán, transparentnos/, verejné 
jednania *i podania amicus curiae, tj. úpravy niektor+ch aspektov medzinárodn+ch 
arbitrá-í, ktoré sa zvlá&/ v oblasti investi*n+ch sporov, javia ako -iadúce. 
Doposia, neuzavretá je tie- problematika medzinárodnej zodpovednosti EÚ 
zahr(ujúca, za prvé, problematiku pri*ítate,nosti konania EÚ a *lensk+m &tátom a za 
druhé, otázku rozdelenia zodpovednosti medzi EÚ a *lenské &táty. V+chodiskom je 
*l. 47 ZEÚ, ktor+ stanoví, -e „Únia má právnu subjektivitu”, tj. od ú*innosti 
Lisabonskej zmluvy bola &truktúra EÚ zjednotená do samostatného právneho 
subjetku.  
Pri ur*ovaní zodpovednosti EÚ v konrétnych otázkach je v&ak na.alej nutné 
re&pektova/ delenie komeptencií na v+lu*né a zdie,ané v súlade s *l. 3 a- *l. 6 ZFEÚ. 
V prípade spolo*nej investi*nej politiky a budúcich EU IIAs, ktoré by boli, ako je 
uvedené vy&&ie, pravdepodobne zmie&aného charakteru, by bolo potrebné v ka-dom 
jednotlivom prípade skúma/, *i sa jedná o protiprávny akt pri*ítate,n+ EÚ alebo 
*lenskému &tátu. Pri interpretácii je mo-né vyu-i/ Návrh *lánkov o zodpovednosti 
medzinárodn+ch organizácií pripraven+ch v rámci OSN v rokoch 2002-2011.159 
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159 Návrh *l. 3 stanoví, -e ka-d+ medzinárodne protiprávny akt medzinárodnej orgánizácie so sebou 
priná&a medzinárodnú zodpovednos/ medzinárodnej organizácie, pri*om protiprávny akt je vymedzen+ 
návrhovan+m *l. 4, ktor+ stanoví, -e akt spo*íva v konini alebo nekonaní za predpokladu, -e je 
pri*ítate,n+ medzinárodnej organizácii pod,a medzinárodného práva a zárove( je poru&ením 
medzinárodného závazku organizácie. Pri*ítate,nos/ aktu rie&i navrhovan+ *l. 5 odst. 1, ktor+ stanoví, 
-e konanie orgánu alebo zmocnenca medzinárodnej organizácie pri v+kone jeho fukncií je pri*ítate,né 
tejto organizácii pod,a mezinárodného práva bez oh,adu na pozíciu, ktorú tento orgánu vo*i 
organizácii zastáva. Pri*itate,nos/ jej narvhovan+mi *lánkami podmienenáefektívnou kontrolu 
predmetného konania emdzinárodnou organizáciou (*l. 6), s t+m, -e za konanie pri*itate,né 
organizácie je mo-né pova-ova/ konanie za rpedpokladu a v rozsahu, -e organizácia ho uzná sa svoj, 
tj. organizácia je zodpovedná za protiprávne konanie v príapde, -e akceptovala svoju zodpovednos/ a 
toto primälo po&kodenú strnu spolieha/ sa na takto uznanú zodpovednos/ medzinárodnej organizácie 
(*l. 61). Otázka núteného protiprávneho konania *lensk+ch &tátov je rie&neá v *l. 16 a *l. 60 a stanoví, 
-e zodpovednos/ organizácie zostáva zachovaná v prípade, -e zmoc(uje alobe odporú*a *lensk+m 
&tátom v+kon protiprávneho aktu a *lensk+ stat jedná na základe tohto zmoznenia *i odoporu*enia, 
zárove( sa v&ak nemo-e dovoláva/ kompetencie organizácie, aby sa vyhovaol plneniu in+ch pre neho z 
neho z medzinárodného práva vypl+vajúcich závazkov. 
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Pri formovaní spolo*nej investi*nej politiky obsahu budúcich EU IIAS je 
nutné po*íta/ s t+m, -e, po prvé, niektoré otázky sú právom EÚ vymedzené 
dostato*ne ur*ite (napríklad, stanovenie v+lu*nej právomoci nad priamymi 
zahrani*n+mi investíciami *i v+lu*nej kompetencie EÚ regulova/ liberalizáciu, tj. 
vstup investícií na vnútorn+ trh EÚ, priamch investícií); po druhé, v nieko,k+ch 
zásadn+ch otázkach medzinárodnej regulácie zahrani*n+ch ivnesticií nebolo doposia, 
prijaté kone*né stanovisko a jeho vymedzenie *asto závisí na bli-&om vymedzení 
cie,ov spolo*nej obchodnej politiky EÚ vo vz/ahu k zahrani*n+m investíciám 
(napríklad otázka regulácie následn+ch &tandardov zaobchádzania, vyvlastnenia *i 
zakotvenie priameho uplatnenia nárokov investorov vo*i EÚ, resp hostite,skému 
&tátu); po tretie, ja potrebné bra/ v úvahu nedodrie&enos/ niektor+ch súvisiacich 
otázok, ako napríklad medzinárodnej zodpovednosti EÚ, *i v+ber fór pre prípadné 
rie&enie investi*n+ch sporov. 
* 
Otázka vhodného nastavenia spolo*nej investi*nej politiky úzko súvisí 
s ústredn+mi princípmi právomocí EÚ – s princípom subsidiarity a proporcionality. 
Princíp subsiadirity vymedzuje právomoci EÚ z poh,adu *lensk+ch &tátov. 
Princíp proporcionality upravuje vz/ah pravomocí EÚ k cie,om jej *inností, tak ako 
ich vymedzejú Zmluvy. 
Princíp subsidiarity, vymedzen+ v *l. 5 odst. 3 ZEÚ stanoví: „Pod!a zásady 
subsidiarity koná Únia v oblastiach, ktoré nepatria do jej v!lu"nej právomoci, len v 
takom rozsahu a vtedy, ak ciele zam!"#ané touto $innos%ou nemô!u "lenské #táty 
uspokojivo dosiahnu! na ústrednej úrovni alebo na regionálnej a miestnej úrovni, a z 
dôvodov rozsahu alebo ú!inkov navrhovanej !innosti ich mo"no lep#ie dosiahnu$ na 
úrovni Únie.“  
Princíp proporcionality je vyjadren+ v *l. 5 odst 4 ZEÚ t+mto spôsobom: 
„Pod!a zásady proporcionality neprekra"uje obsah a forma "innosti Únie rámec 
toho, !o je nevyhnutné na dosiahnutie cie"ov zmlúv.“ 
Základné otázky, ktoré je potrebné zodpoveda/ v tomto oh,ade vo vz/ahu k 
regulácii zahrani*n+ch ivnestícií znejú: Je vhodnej&ie upravova/ zahrani*né investície 
na úrovni EÚ alebo na úrovni jednotliv+ch *lensk+ch &tátov? Ak+ (minimálny) rozsah 
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právmoci EÚ v oblasti zahrani*n+ch investícií bude sta*i/ na efektívnu realizáciu 
cie,ov spolo*nej obchodnej, reps. investi*nej politiky?  
Uvedené zásady sa uplatnania na akúko,vek *innos/ EÚ. Touto prizmou je 
teda vhodné posudzova/ taktie- mo-nosti a limity kompetencie EÚ v oblasti 
zahrani*n+ch investícií.  
* 
Problematika spolo*nej európskej investi*nej politiky a otázka prenosu 
primárnej regulatórnej zodpovednosti v danej oblasti z *lensk+ch &tátov na úrove( EÚ 
je vysoko komplexná.  
Naviac, vzh,adom na to, -e sa jedná o politiku, mno-stvo otázok závisí práve 
na definovaní jej jasn+ch cie,ov, ktoré následne majú, predov&etk+m v práve EÚ, tie- 
právny dosah. 
Okrem toho, spolo*ná európska investi*ná politika sa stále nachádza v &tádiu 
formovania. Pravdou zostáva, -e mno-stvo súvisiacich problematík je závisl+ch na 
dorie&ení *iastkov+ch otázok, ktoré vy-adujú podrobné a detailné spracovanie 
príslu&n+ch okruhov a následnú diskusiu. 
Vy&&ie uvedené zárove( predstavuje hlavné problémy pri koncipovaní 
predkladanej práce. 
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6. ABSTRACT 
6.1 Abstract (SK) 
V sú*astnosti prebieha v rámci Európskej únie záasdná zmena v oblasti 
regulácie zahrani*n+ch investícií spo*ívajúca v presune (niektor+ch) kompetencií 
v danej obalsti z *lensk+ch &tátov na Európsku úniu, a to ako sú*as/ &iri& iniciatívy 
s kone*n+m cie,om vytvori/ spolo*nú európsku investi*nú politiku, ktorá, je 
arguemntované, mô-e eventuálne nahradi/ systém bilaterálnych ivnesti*n+ch dohôd 
uzavret+ch medzi *lensk+mi a tretími &tátmi. 
Od vstupu Lisabonskej zmluvy v ú*innos/ je Európska únia v+lu*ne 
kompetentná regulova/ priame zahrani*né investície vo vz/ahu k tretím &tátom a to na 
základe vlo-enia pojmu „priamych zahrani*n+ch investícií“ do znenia *l. 207 odst. 1 
Zmluvy o fungovaní Euróspekj únie upravujúceho spolo*nú obchodnú politiku, v 
ktorej, v súlade s *l. 3 odst. 1 písm. e), má Európska únie v+lu*nú právomoc. 
Aj ke. znenie *lánku vyzerá na prv+ poh,ad jasne, existuje nieko,ko otázok, 
predov&etk+m vo veci rozsahu novej v+lu*nej kompetencie Európskej únie, ktoré 
doposia, neboli vyrie&ené. 
Po prvé, problematika rozsahu foriem zahrani*n+ch investícií, ktoré by mali 
by/ regulované Európskou úniou v rámci novej kompetencie, je nejasná. Boli 
vznesené argumenty, -e v+lu*ná kompetencia sa vz/ahuje len na priame zahrani*né 
investície, zatia, *o iné formy, v prípade, -e by mali by/ regulované na spolo*nej 
európskej úrovni, by spadali pod zdie,adnú kompetenciu. To by v kone*nom 
dôsledku znamenalo, -e budúce investi*né dohody uzatvorené Európskou úniou, ak 
by mali poskytova/ komplexnú ochranu v rozsahu bilateránych investi*n+ch dohôd, 
by museli by/ uzatvárané ako zmie&ané dohody. 
Po druhé, rozsah následnej regulácie, tj. regulácie po vstupu, resp. vzniku 
investície, je nejasn+. Interpretácie sa rôznia a pokrávajú &kálu po*ínajúc prísne 
re&triktívnymi, limitujúcimi právomoc Únie na reguláciu vstupu na trh a liberalizáciu 
investícií. Interpretácia &tedrej&ie vo*i Únii pripú&/a, -e v+lu*ná kompetencia sa mô-e 
vz/ahova/ aj na následnú reguláciu, ktorá je v&ak limitovaná tzv. „paraleliza*nou 
klauzulou“, *o znamená, -e vonkaj&ia *innos/ Únie je prípustná len v prípade, -e 
paralelne s (ou existuje zhodná vnútorná právomoc. Aplikovanie klazule na 
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predmetnú oblas/ by znamenalo, ako pokra*uje argumentácia, -e ochrana proti 
vyvlastneniu a úprava riadneho a spravodlivého zaobchdádzania by bola vylú*ená.  
Zalo-ená primárne na princípe effet utile, je zastávaná &iroká komplexná 
právomoc Únie, ktorá by umo-(ovala reguláciu zahran*n+ch investícií v rozsahu 
poskytovanou bialterálnymi investi*n+mi dohodami, tj. v duchu tejto interpretácie by 
kompetencia Únie zah0(ala reguláciu pred aj po vstupe, resp. zalo-ení, investície, 
&tandardy zaobchádzania, ochranu proti vyvlastneniu a mechanizmus rie&enia sporov 
zakotvujúci právo vyu-i/ investi*nú arbitrá- na úrovni investor – hos/ujúci &tát. 
Predkladaná práca porovnáva oba regulatórne systémy (tj. úpravu 
bilateraln+ch investi*n+ch dohôd ako aj európskeho práva) so zámerom identifikova/ 
rozdiely a, prípadne, dospie/ k záveru v otázke, *i nová kompetencia Únie má vôbec 
potenciál nahradi/ sú*asnú sie/ bilaterálnych ivnesti*n+ch dohôd uzavret+ch medzi 
*lensk+mi a tretími &tátmi. 
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6.2 Abstract (ENG) 
 
Interaction between Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU law 
 
A major change in the regulation of foreign investments is underway in the 
European Union involving a transfer of (certain) competences within the field from 
Member States to the EU, all being a part of a wider initiative with the ultimate goal 
of establishing a common European investment policy, which, it is argued, might 
eventually replace the network of bilateral investment treaties concluded between 
Member States and third countries.  
Starting with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU is exclusively 
competent to regulate extra-EU foreign direct investments since the term “foreign 
direct investment” was introduced in Article 207 (1) TFEU dealing with the common 
commercial policy, in which, in accordance with Article 3 (1) (e) TFEU, the EU shall 
have exclusive competence. 
Even though the wording is seemingly simple, certain issues, especially 
concerning the scope of the new EU competence, have been raised and are still not 
settled. 
First, the issue of the scope of forms of foreign investments which are to be 
covered by the EU regulation is unclear. It has been argued that the exclusive 
competence extends only over direct investments, while other forms, if they are to be 
covered, would fall under shared competence. This would result in complex future 
EU IIAs having to be concluded in the form of mixed agreements. 
Second, the scope of post-entry regulation is unclear. The interpretation ranges 
from a very restrictive one, limiting the new competence to the regulation of market 
access and liberalization. A more generous approach admits that the competence 
might extend even over post-entry regulation, which would, however, be limited by 
the so called “parallelism clause”, meaning that external action of the EU is 
permissible only in cases when there is a corresponding internal competence. Applied 
to the field of foreign investments, protection against expropriation and coverage of 
! '+!
fair and equitable treatment, as it is argued, is ruled out. Based primarily on effet utile 
principle, a very comprehensive competence is advocated, which would in fact 
covered the entire regulation of foreign investments as it provided for by bilateral 
investment treaties, i.e. the competence, under the mentioned interpretation, would 
cover both pre- and post-entry regulation, standards of treatment, protection against 
expropriation as well as a dispute resolution mechanism providing for investor-state 
arbitration. 
The present thesis compares and contrasts both regulatory systems (i.e. the 
regulation provided for by bilateral investment treaties and EU law) in an attempt to 
identify the differences and, ultimately, draw a conclusion on whether the new EU 
competence actually has the potentially to replace the current network of bilateral 
treaties concluded between Member States and third countries. 
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